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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CANYON COUNTRY REALTY,
COLDWELL BANKER/ARCHES
REALTY, GEORGE COPELAND,
and SHARON COPELAND,

Case No. 980239-CA

Plaintiffs-Appellees,
Oral Argument Priority 15
vs.
NELSON MOYLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
This case involves two cases which arise out of the same claimed contract.
Copeland v. Movie was an action by the buyers, claiming damages resulting from the
seller's refusal to sell the property. Canyon Country Realty v. Moyle was an action by the
real estate agents seeking a commission on the sale. Portions of the cases were decided
jointly by the trial court, and the cases were consolidated by this Court for the appeal.
A.

Canyon Country Realty v. Moyle.

The trial court entered a judgment on March 17, 1998, awarding the real estate
agents a commission, plus interest and attorney fees. The judgment stated that the attorney
fees would be determined later. (R. 102B-103B.) An Order determining the amount of

attorney fees was entered May 6, 1998. (R. 126B-127B.) Moyle filed a Notice of Appeal
from both orders on May 18, 1998. (R. 128B-129B.)
With respect to the May 6, 1998, Order, the Notice of Appeal was filed within
thirty days of the entry of the Order and was timely. Utah R. App. P. 4(a). The Order
determined all claims with respect to all parties and was a final order. Utah R. Civ. P.
54(b). The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j)
(1996). The Supreme Court poured the case over to the Court of Appeals on July 16,
1998. (R. 147B.) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(j) (1996).
The judgment entered March 17, 1998, decided all issues except the amount of
attorney fees. That judgment was arguably final under Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923,
927-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), which was decided nearly two months after entry of the
judgment. Based on that decision, Moyle filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal.
(R. 132B-133B.) Computed from the March 17, 1998, judgment, the last day to appeal
would normally have been April 16, 1998. Utah R. App. P. 4(a). Thirty days (Utah R.
App. P. 4(e)) from that date was May 16, 1998, a Saturday. The motion for extension of
time was filed on Monday, May 18, 1998, which was the next business day. Utah R.
App. P. 22(a). The motion was, therefore, timely under Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. The trial court granted the motion for extension of time by Order
entered June 26, 1998. (R. 145B-146B.) The order extended the time for filing the notice
of appeal to May 18, 1998, the same date the notice of appeal was filed.
2

B.

Copeland v. Moyle.

The judgment appealed from was entered August 5, 1998. (R. 234A-235A.)
Moyle1 s Notice of Appeal was filed fewer than thirty days later, on September 3, 1998.
(R. 236A-237A.) The Notice of Appeal was timely. Utah R. App. P. 4(a). The Utah
Supreme Court had jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0 (1996). The case
was poured over to the Court of Appeals on September 29, 1998. (R. 249A.) The Court
of Appeals has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did Copelands fail to present admissible proof of damages where their expert

gave only an estimate of a fair listing price for the real estate and associated business
combined and there was no evidence of the value of the real estate alone? The trial court's
factual findings will be reversed only if they are against the clear weight of the evidence,
thus making them clearly erroneous. Butler, Crockett and Walsh Development Corp. v.
Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co.. 909 P.2d 225, 228 (Utah 1996) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Moyle objected to and moved to strike the testimony of the
Copelands1 expert on the ground, among others, that the expert testified concerning the
value of a turnkey business, whereas the court had held the contract conveyed only the real
estate plus certain specified additional assets not including the business. (Tr.1 52.) Moyle
renewed the motion to strike after the expert testified that his valuation was also based on
the business including bicycles and other sports equipment. (Id. at p. 55.) The trial court
*The transcript was indexed as R. 251.
3

denied the motion to strike. (Id. at p. 56.) Moyle renewed the argument in closing
arguments (Id. at p. 98), and in objections to the Findings of Fact. (R. 220A-222A.)
2.

Was testimony of a fair or optimum listing price relevant and admissible to

prove fair market value of real property? Review is generally for abuse of discretion.
Pearce v. Wistisen. 701 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 1985). Moyle objected to the testimony
concerning the fair offering price. (Tr. 40.)
3.

Where a real estate agent was prohibited by statute from testifying concerning

value, did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony? "It is within the
discretion of the trial court to determine the suitability of expert testimony in a case and
the qualifications of the proposed expert." Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co.. 781 P.2d 445,
447 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
Moyle objected to the testimony from Copelands1 valuation expert on the grounds, among
others, that the expert was not an appraiser, had not prepared an appraisal report, and had
not performed a formal market analysis on the property. (Tr. pp. 40-41, 43.)
4.

Where a party "accepted" an offer only after modifying it, did the "accep-

tance" constitute a counter-offer which could be withdrawn at anytime before formal
acceptance?

This issue was decided by summary judgment and is reviewed for

correctness. Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving v. Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382, 1385
(Utah 1989). This was raised in Moylefs motions for summary judgment and their
supporting memoranda filed in each case. (R. 151A-179A; 98B-99B; 67B-88B.) The
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argument was renewed during trial in response to evidence that the real estate agent
considered the excluded equipment to be part of the business. (Tr. pp. 52, 55.)
5.

Did the trial court err in awarding attorney fees incurred in obtaining and

defending a default judgment, where the default judgment was set aside? Whether attorney
fees are recoverable is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. A. K.& R.
Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen Construction. 977 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah Ct. App.
1999). This court also reviews for correctness whether the findings are sufficient to
support the award, i.e., whether the party has adequately categorized the time and fees
among the different claims. Foote v. Clark. 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998). Calculation
of the actual amount of the attorney fee is in the sound discretion of the trial court and is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah
1988). This was raised in Moyle's Objection to Attorney's Fees, which asserted that there
was no legal basis for an award of fees. (R. 130A.)
6.

Does the award of afixedjudgment rate of interest violate Utah Code Ann.

§ 15-1-4(2) (1996)? This is a question of statutory interpretation which is reviewed for
correctness. Brown v. David K. Richards & Co.. 978 P.2d 470, 478 (Utah Ct. App.
1999): see also Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989). This
issue is not raised below because it was based on a case decided April 8, 1999, while this
matter was pending on appeal. The Utah Supreme Court has previously held, however,
that interest accrues at the statutory rate even where the judgment does not so provide,
Dairy Distributors. Inc. v. Local Union 976.16 Utah 2d 85, 396 P.2d 47, 48 (1964), and
5

that a failure to specify interest is a clerical error. Id. Accord Fitzgerald v. Critchfield.
744 P.2d 301, 304 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (pre-judgment interest is allowed as a matter of
right even when not specifically pleaded).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-2b-2, 61-2b-3, and 61-2b-9 are reproduced in the Appendix.
These statutes are part of the Utah Real Estate Appraiser Registration and Certification
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-2b-l to -41. There have been minor changes in the cited
sections subsequent to the date of trial, but none that the affect the provisions at issue here.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case. This is an appealfromafinaljudgment in a civil action.

B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. The Copeland case was filed

June 16, 1997, and sought specific performance of a Real Estate Purchase Contract
between the Copelands and Nelson Moyle. A default judgment was initially entered
against Nelson Moyle but later set aside. Additional details concerning that default
judgment are presented in Point V of this brief.
On August 20, 1997, Copelands filed a Motion to Amend Measure of Damages.
The document gave notice that Copelands sought an award of damages based on the
claimed benefit of their bargain and no longer sought specific performance.
The Canyon Country Realty case was filed July 28, 1997, and sought a judgment
against Nelson Moyle for real estate commissions based on the contract alleged in the
Copeland case. (R. 1B-14B.)
6

On February 2, 1998, the Canyon Country Realty plaintiffs filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment supported by a memorandum and affidavits,
motion sought ° A

. ; ..*

^ were entitled to
.

a comn

Purchase Contiaa.

t

Moyle responded to the Motion for Summary Judgment and, asserted that his
purported acceptance of the Real Estate Purchase Contract was a u u _ ,

- .

that the counter-offer was rescmck,: '

>» uiciciore

unenloiuiable

• en, ^
(

|W n7K XXR JI

judgment in both cases assv,w»fc

• ,

sequenth O^G im, OAII motions for summary

_ argument. (R. 151A-177A, 178A 179A, 98B-

99B.)
The motions for summary judgment in both cases were argued before the trial court
i

Hi" "i

^fleeting the oral arguments arc noi indexed bin

appear on the left-hand side of each file.) The court concluded that Moyle1 s "acceptance"
was binding and no; d counter-offer, because the items he excluded from the cunii in i \\ i»
not expressly part oi the initial otlei

ml" u Hit, i 11

i l {'> H \y*\\ 7(HA, k.

• • Based on the summary judgment ruling, the court entered judgment in favor of the
Ciiii)j±. Coumr_ K-1 . plaintiffs foi A cnir.n
attorney fee

'

)
yC w a s

entry

' "

| r i e ( j on Jui> I J , *^^-^. v_ " •

At the hearing, Copelands waived all theories of recovery except the
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benefit of the bargain (difference between the sale price and the fair market value). (Tr.
pp. 76, 78.) The trial court found the value of the property to be $235,000.00, and
awarded judgment for Copelands of $50,000.00. (Tr. 100.) Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (R. 225A-228A) and a Judgment (R. 234A-235A) were entered
August 5, 1998. Execution on the judgment has been stayed pending the appeal. (R.
245A-246A.)
The appeals in the Copeland case and the Canyon Country Realty case were
consolidated by order entered December 15, 1998.
C.

Statement of Facts. In May, 1995, Nelson Moyle purchased the Canyon

Country Bed & Breakfast, which was an existing bed and breakfast business in Moab,
Utah. (Tr. 14.) In September, 1996, after his wife had filed for divorce, Moyle listed the
property for sale through Canyon Country Realty. (R. 30B-33B.) The listing price was
$298,000.00. (R. 34B.) The listing agent was Randy Day, a salesman with Canyon
Country Realty. (Id.)
On January 7, 1997, George and Sharon Copeland, then living in Steamboat
Springs, Colorado, presented an offer to purchase the property for $185,000.00. (R. 35B4IB.) Copelands were represented in making the offer by Kelly Stetler of Coldwell
Banker/Arches Realty.
On January 13, 1997, Nelson Moyle signed the offer in the space provided for
acceptance. (R. 40B.) Moyle also, however, added the following to the list of excluded

8

aragraph 1.2 of'the contra..

All skis, water & snow, bikes, kayaks and other

personal sports equipment not included "PR 11 IP; aflat IK d In 1 Hidings in Appends "
Moyle's agent, kiiiidy M>M ill111 >MIUU tin JILJU
Copelar.

-

M

miriiniil In (> v\\\ SUlin,

* ' he Copelands to review Moyle's changes and deii'i mine

if they were acceptable. (R. 78B, 81B-82B.) George Copeland informed Stetler that
Copelands had no problem, with the changes, fid

ol, however, sign any

document reflecting their acceptanc
Lain nil I In* saiih'

Mu7

'

orally rescinded the "acceptance.

^_. allowed .\

changing the sales price to $255,000.00.
$185,000.00 c i ^ , had been act 4;.
c

Neison Mo>k contacted his agent and

f™ *

""

written counter-offer

opelands believed iliiii the

«, Uw\ »>"ij m i l i h - l ' " i>« pi <h' V?SS,000.00
• followed up with a letter on February 6, 1997,

confirming that he did not consider the contract to be binding, (R, RIB )
Although they knew by at least February 6, 199J , 111 a I Moylc did nol intend h nil
the property, Copelands ihcreattei sold llintii u-suk-iiu HI Sd/ajiibiiitl Spring i \>lnMdu
111 ni I ( III "imr |nh'i | IIIIIII iiiisniJ nil ni ni o t h e r h o m e in Moaf), a n d m o v e d t o M o a b w i t h t h e i n t e n t o f
starting a new bed and breakfast. (Ti. 62-63, 70 j
At the trial on July IV 19Q8. Copelands presented evidence through Randy Uayn
Moyle's real estate ager
hreaklasl bust HI s^«

,<^. ..e spropeil) li-id In VM marketed it. ii imiitn " lied ,md
with the ruling on summai y judgment, the trial
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court nonetheless held that only the items specifically listed on the Real Estate Purchase
Contract were included in the sale, and that the sale did not include the business. (Tr. 35.)
Copelands presented evidence of the value of the property only through Randy Day.
Mr. Day was a licensed real estate agent but was not a licensed appraiser. (Tr. 23, 40.)
Mr. Day had previously owned and operated Canyon Country Property Services, which
booked rooms at all the bed and breakfast businesses and motels in Moab. Through that
business, he had visited every bed and breakfast in town and was familiar with them. (Tr.
46.) He testified that in the course of his real estate business, he had sometimes prepared
market analyses for properties. (Tr. 37.) He did not perform a formal market analysis for
this property (Tr. 43) but had informally considered what an appropriate price might be
in order to determine whether to list the property for Moyle. (Tr. 44.) Over the objection
of Moyle, Day testified: "I thought the optimum opinion was around a $25,000 range.
It's where we would come in and then make a fair settlement on the B&B and I think that
would have been a fair price at the time." (Tr. 49.) Day further testified that the value
he had given was the value for a turnkey business. (Tr. 51.) He testified that he
understood the business to include everything except for some skis on the wall and some
ski boots and a couple of pictures. (Tr. 50.) He testified that the telephone line and the
phone number were an important part of the business. (Tr. 54-55.)
Moyle testified that the telephone line used in the Canyon Country Bed & Breakfast
was owned by Canyon Country Bed & Breakfast, L.L.C., and was also used by a tour
company owned by Moyle. (Tr. 83, 86, 89.) George Copeland, in rebuttal testimony,
10

conceded that the telephone line was not included as part of the purchase agreement. '
91.)
No testimony was presented regarding

that

Nelson Moyle leslifi il that the telephone hm- i.s otrenidv crucial to the bed and breakfast
business, and "it isn t a business without the phone lines.

(' I "i 87 ) He further explained

that the advertisements for the business are placed once a year prior to the start of the
tourist season, and that it is important I ,> ii.ii i \ 1111 idephoik IIMIIIIK'I1 iiiii ill ist1 mh mi? inig
pnl'llUI1

'II

Ii

w

I iy! ' )

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This is an appeal from two cases, both, of which arise mi i mil I \ •mm UcJ Klate
]

that no binding contract existed and

refused to sell the proper . x ne first case (Cany ui. C

) lie ally v. Moyle) was brought

by the real estate ag; snts to recover a claimed commission. The second case 'r^pc* -. •- \
Moyle) was brought by the buyers to recover the claimed benchl ol I lie; baigam
There \vd in kiifoi -uNr COIIIMI i 10 M II iiiii | IIIII i | "iiiii'v Although Moyle signed the
Copelands' olic± to purchase in me place indicated for acceptance, he do so only a fin
changing the tenmcounteroffer
Copelands

r

-?<

"~

A

- qualified acceptance is not an acceptance, h*f

'Movie's acceptance/counteroffer was .. . „.
ILii, ru«b, iL'ivlm.1 u • ilnnrabk >i
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n

* i4
-•

*« nouns

for commissions and the Copelands' claim for damages accordingly fail for lack of a
predicate contract.
Even if the contract was enforceable, the Copelands did not present admissible
evidence of damages. The only testimony of value was given by Randy Day, one of the
real estate agents. He was not a licensed appraiser, and was statutorily prohibited from
testifying concerning the value of the real property. In addition, the value estimate he gave
was for the business, whereas the Copelands admitted they did not contract to buy the
business, but only the real property and certain additional assets specified in the contract.
There was no evidence of the value of the assets purchased by Copelands.
The trial court took the supposed value of the business and made a reduction to
arrive at a value for the assets purchased. There was no evidentiary basis whatsoever for
the amount of the reduction. Finally, the value testimony given was not fair market value
of the business, but fair listing price. There simply was no admissible evidence to support
the trial court's finding of damages.
Two additional rulings of the trial court were erroneous. The trial court granted
Copelands judgment for attorney fees as part of a default judgment, after the default
judgment had been set aside. There was no legal basis for the attorney fee award. Finally,
the interest rate specified on the judgments should be corrected to comply with the statute
as interpreted by this Court.
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ARGUMENT

COPELANDS P R E S E N T E D N O EVIDENCE OF THE VALUE
OF THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THE CONTRACT,
AND THUS FAILED TO PRESENT ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE OF DAMAGES.
The on] \ i*\ idence of value presented to the u iat , ourf was throujin N.;.
is not and did is* *. , >ai;>. u ;>, ah appra:* .
breakfast buauiv.^

and
m court concluded that Copelani

red

t< purchaau winj m*, real estate anc Ljiuim specified personal pioperty, and did not
contract to purchase the business Among the items not nit luded were die iclcphoiu linn s
and numbers \% .,.,.*. were pul..
(

.* . u v

,

Hi were the means

pciaikfe presented no evidence of the value of

those telephone lines (which value would need to lie deducted from,, the value of the
business), and therefore did not present any evidence ol the value oi the real estate and
specified assets described in the LOIIIUH 1
11 liii i1 uiii'i mil (iii ii.kjit',;., n linT-i ,„i, „. iTiiloi' has bi eached a land sale contract is the
market value 01 the property at aiu LIIU. oT th. n? ich les^ -he , ontract price tr the
vendee." Bunnell v. Bills, 13 ITtah ?d ^

^

P V.

case further held tna* to warr^

^

»ertv there must

* ,ib as win warrant a finding cl \alu^ ^m*
reasonable certainty." In Bunnell, the vendor had agreed to sell the Alta motel and certain
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personal property to Bunnell for $175,000.00. The vendor later breached the contract and
sold the motel to Willardson Motel Lodges for $180,000.00. The trial court awarded
Bunnell damages of $5,000.00, the difference between the two contract prices, but the
Supreme Court reversed. The court noted that the two contracts were on different payment
terms, and that the Willardson contract included additional personal property. The court
concluded:
The other supporting evidence for a $180,000 market
value that plaintiff claims to exist, such as plaintiff's opinion
that the value of the Alta would increase, and implications
from the entire record, does not contain the degree of certainty
which a reasonably accurate ascertainment of market value
would require. This is especially true where additional
evidence was readily available for a more accurate valuation.
Damages cannot be found from mere speculative and
conjectural evidence, and therefore the trial court1 s finding that
Stevens1 breach damaged plaintiff in the amount of $5,000
cannot be supported by the evidence and cannot be upheld.
368 P.2d at 602.
If the $180,000 actual sale price in Bunnell was too speculative and conjectural to
support a damage award, it is even more certain that the admittedly "soft"2 estimate of a
listing price range given by Mr. Day for the entire business is too uncertain to prove fair
market value of the real estate.
Other Utah cases support this requirement of certainty. In Atkin Wright & Miles
v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co.. 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985), the court
2

Copelands' counsel acknowledged in closing arguments that Copelands' evidence of value
was soft: "And the Court has good evidence, I will concede that it is not a hard number, it's a little
soft, but I think there is a very good basis." (Tr. 96.)
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694 P.2d 1031 (Utah 1984), the jury awarded $76,675.00 in compensation for condemnation of the defendant* s property. Three experts had testified at trial. One defense expert
placed the combined value of the real estate taken plus the severance damages to the
remaining real estate at $141,000.00. Another defense expert placed the combined total
at $166,806.00. The plaintiffs expert placed the combined total at $90,589.00, but
testified that severance damages had been offset by special benefits to the defendants so
that the net total value of the taking was $44,275.00. On appeal, the Supreme Court held
that there were no offsetting benefits to justify reducing the value to $44,275.00. The
Supreme Court concluded, therefore, that the lowest combined estimate of value was
$90,589.00. The Court held: "The jury award of $76,675.00 was lower than any of [the
appraisal estimates] and thus is not supported by the evidence.

The verdict must,

therefore, not be permitted to stand."
A similar issue was presented in State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985). Carter
had been charged with third-degree theft for stealing a camera in Salt Lake County. Thirddegree theft requires that the amount stolen exceed $250.00. Two experts testified at trial.
The prosecution's expert, from Price, Utah, testified that the value of the equipment was
$490.00. He also testified, however, that he worked exclusively in Price and was familiar
only with camera values in Price. The defense expert, a Salt Lake dealer, testified that the
stolen equipment was worth $177.00. The court held:
The value of the used camera equipment was not a fact
within the common knowledge of the jury. Since the only
evidence of the value of the camera equipment at the place it
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was stolen was the testimony of Mr Schmidt, the only value
supported by the evidence was the figure he gave, $177.00.
Cross examination of Mr. Schmidt disclosed no factual basis
for a higher estimate. The State cites no case, and we have
been unable to find any ourselves, which allows a jury to
disregard expert testimony as to the fair market value of stolen
property and fix a higher value when there is no basis in the
evidence properly before the court to justify that value. Of
course, a jury is free to disregard expert testimony in whole or
in part, but see State i ' Boyd, Utah 692 P.2d 769 (1984), and
it may also discount the value of property estimated by an
expert. In this case, however, the issue is not the right to
disregard an expert's testimony, but whether there was any
admissible evidence to support a finding that the value of the
camera exceeded $250.00. There was none.
707 P.2d at 662-63.
In this cast.\ there similarly wa~ nr evidence to support *he H a l court's arbitrary
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POINT n
THE TESTIMONY CONCERNING FAIR OR OPTIMUM LISTING VALUE
WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE FAIR MARKET VALUE.
Mr. Day's testimony is inadmissible because he failed to expressly testify
concerning fair market value of the business.3

At most, Mr. Day testified that

$250,000.00 was the "optimum opinion" and that it would have been a "fair price." (Tr.
49.) He did not testify that $250,000.00 was the fair market value. The distinction is
critical, as illustrated by the Utah Supreme Court case of Mallinckrodt v. Salt Lake
County, 983 P.2d 566 (Utah 1999). The Mallinckrodts presented an appraisal giving an
opinion of the "current minimum market value" of the subject property. The Supreme
Court held that testimony was inadmissible on the issue of fair market value:
The Mallinckrodts' evidence of value is flawed. That
evidence consists of an unsigned appraisal setting forth a
current minimum market value, not fair market value, which
is the required standard. The Mallinckrodts argue that their
evidence of current minimum market value equates to fair
market value because a certified appraiser made the valuation.
That does not follow. Fair market value is statutorily defined
as "the amount at which property which change hands between
a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any
compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts." Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(8).
Certainly a certified appraiser must be aware that the term
"fair market value" is a legal term of art that provides the
determinative standard in cases such as this. Whatever
"current minimum market value" is, and neither the
3

Point I of this brief argues that testimony of the fair market value of the business was
irrelevant and therefore inadmissible, because the relevant issue was the fair market value
of the real property and assets listed in the contract. This Point II argues that even if fair
market value of the business were relevant, Mr. Day's testimony did not fit the bill.
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Mallinckrodts nor their appraiser has explained it, it does not
appear to be equivalent to fair market value.
983 P.2d at 569.
A review of Randy Day's testimony illustrates that he was concerned only with
determining an optimum price at which he would be willing to list the property. For
example, Mr. Day testified as follows:
Q
[by Mr. Russell] Is it important to you to have
some kind of estimate on the value of real estate when you are
involved particularly with a sale?
A

[Randy Day] It certainly is.

Q
And do you, as a practical matter, attempt to
make it that sort of evaluation on property that you are
involved in as an agent for a sale?
A

I do.

Q

Did you do that with this property?

A
I suggested what I thought would be an optimum
price before we listed but we were a little higher than what I
thought was an optimum price and we could prove as an
income property, yeah.
Q
When you talk about optimum price, are you
talking about price supported by what you know about the
market?
A

By the basic market, yes.

Q

What was that price?

(Tr. 39-40.)
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After objections to foundation and relevance, Mr. Day ultimately gave his opinion
as follows:
Q

What is it?

A
I though the optimum opinion was around a
$250,000 range. It's where we would come in and then make
a fair settlement on the B&B and I think that would have been
a fair price at the time. . . .
(Tr. 49.)
In response to cross-examination, Mr. Day further explained his opinion as follows:
Q
[by Mr. Slaugh] What did you mean by a
$250,000 range and then a make fair settlement for the B&B,
can you explain that?
A
Yeah, when we were discussing it, Nelson and
I were discussing it, he said he wanted to stay just under
$300,000 and that's what we did and I said, "Well, we realize
that, you know, we are a little high," he said, "Well, it's
easier to come down than it is to go up," and I agreed, and
he's the owner so he can set his price anywhere he wants and
I told him that I thought the $250,000 would be where we get
a fair market value. That would be a fair price for the
property.
(Tr. 50.)
Although Mr. Day used the phrase "fair market value" once in response to crossexamination, it is clear from the overall tenor of his testimony that he was saying the same
as he testified on direct, that $250,000 was an optimum listing price.4 It is clear that he

^ h e testimony on cross-examination is also deficient because it does not purport to testify
concerning the fair market value, but only to report what Mr. Day told Mr. Moyle prior to listing
the property. The only testimony of value given by Mr. Day was that given on direct, that the
optimum listing price was $250,000.
20

was not purporting to give an expert opinion as to the actual price at which the property
would sell. In fact, he clarified his "fair market value" statement to explain that $250,000
would be a "fair price" for the property. A fair price for listing purposes is not the same
as fair market value.

POINT in
COPELANDS' EXPERT WAS NOT A LICENSED REAL
ESTATE APPRAISER AND WAS PROHIBITED BY
STATUTE FROM TESTIFYING CONCERNING
THE VALUE OF REAL PROPERTY.
The only evidence concerning value in this case was given by Randy Day, who was
the listing real estate agent for the property. He was not a certified appraiser. Although
questions concerning the qualifications of an expert witness are reviewed for abuse of
discretion, Butler. Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline, 909 P.2d 225, 233
(Utah 1995), the necessary qualifications for an individual testifying concerning value of
real property are specified by statute. Utah Code Ann. § 61-2b-3 and § 61-2b-9 provide
that it is unlawful to prepare an appraisal report without first being registered or certified
as an appraiser.
The statute defines "appraisal report" as "any communication, written or oral, of
an appraisal." Utah Code Ann. § 61-2b-2 (as enacted 1996; amendments in 1998 did not
affect the quoted provision). This statute further provides that" [t]he testimony of a person
relating to the person's analyses, conclusions, or opinions concerning identified real estate
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or identified real property is considered to be an oral appraisal report." Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-2b-2(3)(c). Oral testimony in court is, therefore, an "appraisal report" as defined in
the statute. Section 61-2b-3 prohibits a person not licensed as an appraiser from giving
such a report.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2b-3 has been addressed in one Utah Supreme Court decision,
Utah Association of Counties v. Tax Commission, 895 P.2d 825 (Utah 1995). In that
case, the plaintiffs claimed an appraiser could not testify concerning value of a business
because he was not registered or certified under § 61-2b-3. The court held the prohibition
did not apply in that case because the appraiser did not testify concerning the value "of
specified interest in, or aspects of, identified real estate or identified real property." The
court held the statute did not apply because " [n]o real estate was identified" in the appraisal
report. 895 P.2d at 830. In this case, in contrast, the primary focus of Mr. Dayfs
"appraisal" was a specifically identified parcel of real estate. Section 61-2b-3 prohibited
him from testifying as to the value of that property.
Randy Day was not a licensed appraiser, and the trial court abused its discretion in
permitting him to testify concerning the value of real property. In addition, the testimony
given did not state the fair market value of the property, but only stated what Mr. Day
considered to be a fair price at which he would list the business. Finally, Mr. Day's
testimony only addressed the entire business, not the assets described in the Real Estate
Purchase Contract. There was, therefore, no admissible evidence on the question of the
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fair market value of the assets purchased, and the judgment of the trial court must be
reversed.

POINT IV
MOYLES "ACCEPTANCE" WAS LEGALLY A COUNTER-OFFER
BECAUSE IT PROPOSED ADDITIONAL TERMS.
The trial court decided, on summary judgment, that Moyle accepted Copelands1
offer to purchase Moylefs property. The documents show that Moyle checked a box
indicating his acceptance of the offer, but only after changing the offer, by interlineation,
to exclude personal property which Moyle testified was an integral part of the bed and
breakfast business.
Whether a contract existed is a question of law. Herm Hughes & Sons. Inc. v.
Ouintek. 834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The law requires an offer and an
unqualified acceptance. A purported acceptance which adds additional terms is not an
acceptance, but a counter-offer.
This rule is illustrated by Sproul v. Parks. 116 Utah 368, 210 P.2d 436 (1949),
which also involved a plaintiff suing to recover a real estate commission. The defendant
sellers had offered to sell property on terms; the plaintiff real estate agent produced a
buyer who was willing to pay cash. When the sellers would not agree to the cash sale, the
real estate agent modified the offer to conform to the terms contained in the listing
contract. The sellers then signed the offer, but added, "This deal is acceptable provided
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the down payment is $8,500.00." There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether the
buyer orally agreed to the down payment, but there clearly was no written acceptance.
The trial court found there was no contract, and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed. The
opinion treats the sellers1 "acceptance" as a counter-offer, and affirmed judgment against
the real estate agent because, among other reasons, the acceptance/counter-offer was not
accepted in writing by the buyer during the listing period.
Of similar effect is Benya v. Stevens and Thompson Paper Co.. 468 A.2d 929 (Vt.
1983). The plaintiff made an offer to buy timber land. The defendants attorney signed
the offer to indicate acceptance but, as in the instant case, made some changes by
interlineation. The plaintiff later attempted to enforce the agreement consistent with the
interlineated terms, and the trial court held the agreement was binding. The Vermont
Supreme Court reversed, stating:
The law relative to contract formation has long been
well settled in Vermont and elsewhere. For an acceptance of
an offer to be valid, it must substantially comply with the
terms of the offer. An acceptance that modifies or includes
new terms is not an acceptance of the original offer; it is a
counteroffer by the offeree that must be accepted or rejected
by the original offeror. The offeror's acceptance of the
offeree's counteroffer may be accomplished either expressly or
by conduct.
468 A.2d at 931 (citations omitted).
This principle is expressed in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 59 (1981) as
follows:
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A reply to an offer which purports to accept it but is
conditional on the offeror's assent to terms additional to or
different from those offered is not an acceptance but is a
counter-offer.
The illustration to that section states:
A makes an offer to B, and B in terms accepts but adds,
"This acceptance is not effective unless prompt
acknowledgment is made of receipt of this letter." There is no
contract, but a counter-offer.
It is clear from the depositions of the Copelands and their real estate agent that they
did not understand the additional terms interlineated by Moyle to be automatically binding
on them. Rather, they understood that the terms would not be binding on them without
their consent. Kelly Stetler reviewed the additions with the Copelands to determine if the
additions would be acceptable to them. Such actions are consistent with the fact that the
"acceptance" was, under the law, a counter-offer which was binding only if accepted.
In addition, Randy Day, Moyle1 s real estate agent, testified at trial that he
understood that the property had been listed as a going business, and that the business
included some bicycles and other equipment that Moyle used as part of the business. (Tr.
55.)

Moyle1 s affidavit submitted in opposition to the summary judgment motions

confirmed that the excluded items had been used as part of the bed and breakfast business.
(R. 187A-188A, 100B-101B.)
Taking all reasonable inferences from this testimony, it is clear that the excluded
items were material. They were items which were arguably part of the transaction, and

which were part of the income stream for the business. Moyle1 s exclusion of those items
25

from the sale created a counter-offer, which was not binding because it was not accepted
by the Copelands prior to the time Moyle withdrew it. Summary judgment on this issue
was improper.
POINT V
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES FOR WORK IN
OBTAINING A DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST
MOYLE WAS ERROR.
The summons and complaint in the Copeland case were served on April
Williamson, who was then residing at the bed and breakfast property. (R. 21 A.) When
Moyle did not respond to the summons and complaint, Copelands obtained a Default
Judgment and Notice of Hearing to Enter Damages, which was entered July 14, 1997. (R.
25A-26A.)
At the time the summons and complaint were served on April Williamson, Moyle
had not resided at the bed and breakfast location for several months. He later visited Moab
and was informed of the pendency of the action. He learned of the action on July 16,
1997, and filed his motion to set aside the judgment 13 days later, on July 29, 1997. (R.
44A-45A, 53A-54A.)
At the time he filed his motion to set aside the judgment, Moyle also filed a motion
for continuance of the evidentiary hearing under the prior default judgment, which was
then set for July 30, 1997. (R. 42A.) The minute entry for the hearing reflects that Moyle
appeared personally, but his attorney was not able to appear. The court proceeded to hear
evidence. The court ordered Moyle to specifically perform the contract within one month
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and awarded plaintiffs their reasonable attorney fees. The court did not award any other
damages. (Minute Entry, left side of record A file.)
On August 19, 1997, the trial court entered a ruling setting aside the default
judgment. (R. 100A-101 A.) The following day, August 20, 1997, but apparently before
they had received the court's ruling, plaintiffs filed their Motion to Amend Measure of
Damages. (R. 102A-114A.) This motion sought to reject the specific performance
previously ordered by the court and asked instead for an award of damages for the benefit
of plaintiffs' bargain. On the same day, plaintiffs filed an Affidavit Regarding Attorney
Fees. (R. 115A-117A.) An amended affidavit was filed September 3, 1997, seeking
$2,731.25 in fees and $120.00 in costs. (R. 123A-126A.)
Moyle objected to the claimed fees on the ground that there was no basis for an
award of attorney fees in the action. (R. 130A.) On January 7, 1998, the court entered
its Ruling Regarding Attorneys' Fees. (R. 143A.) The ruling did not comment on the
legal basis for an award of fees, but only stated that the requested amount was reasonable.
A formal judgment awarding the requested fees of $2,731.25 was entered on January 29,
1998. (R. 147A-148A.)
It is important to note the state of the record at the time the trial court entered its
January 29, 1998, judgment for attorney fees. The default judgment had been previously
set aside. (R. 100A-101 A.) Moyle had answered the plaintiffs' complaint and demanded
a jury trial. (R. 127A-129A.) No other proceedings had occurred subsequent to the
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answer. At the time of the attorney fee judgment, there was no ruling still in force which
granted plaintiffs any right to attorney fees.
"Generally, attorney fees in Utah are awarded only as a matter of right under a
contract or statute." Foote v. Clark. 962 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998). At the time of the
award here, no contract had been enforced by the court, and there was no statute which
granted a right to attorney fees. There was no legal right to fees at the time of the
judgment.
Even viewed in hindsight, after the trial court held that the contract was enforceable, the January 29, 1998, attorney fee award cannot stand. A review of the affidavit
reveals that most of the time (14.75 hours, or 68% of the total) was spent in obtaining and
defending the default judgment. This effort was unsuccessful and no fees should have been
awarded for it, particularly where the grounds for relief from the judgment, defective
service of process and lack of actual notice, were relatively clear.
The law regarding an award of attorney fees was recently summarized by the Utah
Supreme Court as follows:
An award of attorney fees must be based on the
evidence and supported by findings of fact. . . . In this
regard,, we have mandated that a party seeking fees must
allocate its fee request according to its underlying claims. . .
. Indeed, the party must categorize the time and fees expended
for (1) successful claims for which there may be an entitlement
to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there would
have been an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been
successful, and (3) claims for which there is no entitlement to
attorney fees. . . .
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The trial court, in turn, must make an independent
evaluation of the reasonableness of the requested fees in light
of the parties1 evidentiary submissions. . . .
The trial court should also document its evaluation of
the requested fees1 reasonableness through findings of fact. .
. . These findings should mirror the requesting party's
allocation of fees per claims and parties and should support
any award issued. . . . They enable the reviewing court to
make an independent review of the fee award, and whether the
findings are sufficient to support the award is a question of law
reviewed for correctness. . . .
Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
The January 29, 1998, judgment does not comply with these requirements. There
is no discussion as to why any attorney fees should be awarded. There are nofindingsas
to why the entire amount requested was awarded, even though most of the fees related to
an unsuccessful default judgment. The January 29, 1998, judgment should be reversed.
POINT VI
THE JUDGMENTS SHOULD BE AMENDED TO PROVIDE
FOR INTEREST AT THE STATUTORY RATE.
The judgments entered in this action each state that they will accrue interest at
7.468 %. This was the interest rate in effect at the time each judgment was entered. Utah
Code Ann. § 15-1-4(2) (1996). The statute does not state whether the rate in effect at the
time of the judgment continues for the life of the judgment. The administrative office of
the courts has stated its opinion that the rate in effect at the time of the judgment continues
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through the life of the judgment. (Memorandum from AOC, attached in Appendix.)
Moyle, accordingly, did not object to the interest rate stated in the judgments.
In Brown v. David K. Richards & Co.. 978 P.2d 470, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1999),
the Utah Court of Appeals considered this question. The court recognized that it was an
issue of first impression. In that case, the question was whether the prior 12% rate in
effect at the time of the judgment should continue through the life of the judgment. The
court held that "when the interest rate is changed by statute, the rate of interest on a
judgment is also changed." (Id (citation and internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted).)
The judgment interest rate has changed since entry of the judgments at issue here,
and will likely change in the future. A summary of the interest rates, based on information
obtained from the administrative office of the courts, appears in the Appendix.
Moyle contends that each of the judgments appealed from should be reversed. In
the event any of the judgments remain in force, each such judgment should be amended
to provide that interest accrues at afloatingrate of interest, based on the judgment rate in
effect for each year.
CONCLUSION
No evidence supports the trial court'sfindingthat the value of the contract property
was $235,000. The real estate agent's testimony that the business should be listed at
$250,000 was (1) irrelevant to the issue of the value of the contract property, (2) not the
same as fair market value, and (3) prohibited by statute. Even if the evidence were
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admissible, there was no evidence to support the arbitrary adjustment from the supposed
value of the business to reach a value for the contract property. Copelands failed to
present admissible evidence of damages. The judgment for Copelands must be reversed.
The judgment in favor of the real estate agents is based on an offer which was not
accepted.

An acceptance with qualifications is not an acceptance.

The summary

judgments for the real estate agents and Copelands must be reversed, and summary
judgment granted to Moyle.
The attorney fee award based on the default judgment must be reversed because
there was no order to support granting the judgment.
Any judgments not reversed should be amended to provide for interest at the
statutory rate.
DATED this Y^ day of November, 1999.

LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
/j
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing were mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this

'

day of November, 1999.

Steve Russell, Esq.
Grand County Law & Justice Center
729 Bartlett Circle
Moab, UT 84532
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APPENDIX "A"

Ruling on Motion to Set Aside Default
Judgment, Copeland v. Movie, entered August
19, 1997 (R. 100A-101A)

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County, Utah

FILED

AUG 1 9 1997 1

THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE & SHARON COPELAND,
Plaintiff,

RULING ON
MOTION TO SET ASIDE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT

v.
NELSON D. MOYLE,
Defendant.

Case No. 970700077
Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Defendant has moved to set aside the default and
default judgment in this case on the grounds that
never properly served,

1) he was

2) his neglect is excusable.

Plaintiffs

object, arguing that defendant was properly served, his neglect
is not excusable but instead part of a pattern of manipulation,
and defendant has no legitimate defense.
The evidence presented by plaintiff does not persuade
the Court that the place at which the summons and complaint were
delivered was defendants usual place of abode.

Moreover, the

Court does not consider it likely that defendant would have
ignored the summons at the risk of being defaulted, had he
actually been aware of the summons.

Finally, the defenses which

defendant apparently intends to assert are not transparently
without merit.

The motion is accordingly granted.

^

COPELAND V. MOYLE
RULING ON MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Counsel for defendant should submit a formal order
pursuant to Rule 4-504.

This ruling does not affect the

temporary restraining order and injunction previously ordered by
the Court.
DATED this 19th day of August, 1997.

Lyle R. Anderson, District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY
I certify that on August 19, 1997, I mailed/hand
delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing RULING ON
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Natasha Hawley
Attorney for Plaintiffs
818 Oak Street
Moab, UT 84532

Douglas Gubler
Attorney for Defendant
4659 S. Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
/
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APPENDIX "B"

Judgment, Copeland v. Moyle. entered
January 29, 1998 (R.147A-148A)

GRAND COUNTY LAW & JUSTICE CENTER
Steve Russell, Attorney (USB#2831)
Attorney for the Plaintiff
394 West 400 North
Moab.Utah 84532

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County, Utah

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT""®

J A N 2 9 1998

FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH
GEORGE & SHARON
COPELAND,

Judgment

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 9707-77

NELSON MOYLE.
Judge Anderson
Defendant.

The Court having previously issued a ruling awarding plaintiffs' counsel
attorneys' fees and costs on prior proceedings. The Court having since reviewed
the affidavit of plaintiffs' counsel regarding fes and costs, as well as defendant's
response, and finding the amount requested by plaintiffs' counsel to have been
reasonably and necessarily incurred,
JUDGMENT, in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant is hereby
entered in the amount of $2,731.25, which amount shall accrue interest at the rate
of 7.468% until paid.
Dated t h i s ^ j d a y of " " J ^ i i y f l r O *
^^^

, 1998.

BY THE COURT

NORABLE LYLE ANDERSON

District Court Judge

Approved as to Form & Content

Douglas Gubler
Attorney for the Defendant

Mailing Certificate
The foregoing JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, to defendant's
counsel DOUGLAS GUBLER, 4659 Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
on January 8,1998.

APPENDIX "C"

Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law,
Canyon Country Realty v. Movie, entered
March 17, 1998 (R. 104B-116B)

GRAND COUNTY LAW & JUSTICE CENTER
Steve Russell, Attorney (USB #2831)
Attorney for the Plaintiff
394 West 400 North
Moab, Utah 84532
Telephone: (801)259-7321

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County, Utah
FILED

MAR 1 ? 1998

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH

CANYON COUNTRY REALTY,
and COLDWELL
BANKER/ARCHES REALTY,

Findings of Fact &
Conclusions of Law

Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil No. 9707-96

NELSON MOYLE,
Judge Anderson
Defendant.

On March 3, 1997, the Court heard cross-motions for summary judgment The parties
were both present represented by coxmsel of record. After considering the record, pleadings and
argument of the respective parties, the Court hereby makes and enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On September 12, 1996, the defendant entered a Listing Agreement & Agency

Disclosure with Canyon Country Realty (Randy Day, Broker and Agent) to sell certain property
located at 590 North 500 West in Moab, Grand County, Utah. A copy of the Listing Agreement is
attached hereto and incorporated by reference.

2.

On January 7, 1997, George and Sharon Copeland submitted a Real Estate

Purchase Contract for the property through their agent Kelly Stelter of Coldwell Banker/Arches
Realty.
3.

The offer was submitted to defendant on January 13, 1997, and accepted in

writing. A copy of the Real Estate Purchase Contract is attached hereto and incorporated by reference.
4.

In accepting the offer, the defendant added the following language to Section 1.2

(Excluded Items) on the Real Estate Purchase Contract,
"All skis, water & snow, bikes, kayaks and other personal sports
equipment not included/'
5.

The Court finds that language to be superfluous and of no impact to the accepted

offer since the Buyers had not offered to purchase the excepted items. (This Finding applies even
if, as defendant alleged, some or all of the excepted equipment had been used for rental by
customers of defendant's bed & breakfast)
6.

The defendant also inserted his name in Section 5 (Confirmation of Agency

Disclosure) of the Real Estate Purchase Contract
7.

The Court finds this addition was merely disclosure as required by law of the

fact that defendant was, at all relevant times, a licensed real estate agent, and that such disclosure
did not effect the substantive rights or obligations of the Buyers, Seller or real estate agents
involved in the transaction.
8.

Following his acceptance of the Copelands' offer, defendant submitted an

"Addendum No. 1" which purported to increase the price of the property from $185,000 to
$255,000.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby makes and enters the
following,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendant's acceptance of the Copelands7 purchase offer as set forth above

constitutes a valid and binding contract for the purchase of the real estate.
2.

Upon acceptance of the offer, the plaintiff real estate agents were entitled to a

sales commission pursuant to the terms of the Listing Agreement
3.

Defendant's exclusion of personal property that the buyers had not offered to

purchase did not constitute a Counteroffer, as a matter of law.
4.

Defendant's agency did not impact the contact that had been created by his

acceptance of the Copelands' purchase offer as a matter of law.
5.

Based on the foregoing, plaintiffs7 Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby

GRANTED, and defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED.
6.

Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorneys7 fees and costs incurred in the

action pursuant to Section 8 of the Listing Agreement & Agency Disclosure.
Dated this

_1998.
BY THE COURT

Approved as to Form & Content

Leslie Slaugh
Attorney for the Defendant

1 Hi
REALTOR-

LISTING AGREEMENT & AGENCY D^CLOSURE
( P A R T A)

S;;OYTV;;™

THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENT
READ CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING

THIS AGREEMENT is entered into by and between £~ a-^^y**^
(the "Company") and A/^,J!L~^
/ i ^ ^ y £ ^

Q-&-<us-*tZy

&^i&£^S
(the "Seller")

1. TERM OF LISTING. The Seller hereby grants the Company, including / ^ g g / x x ^
£/Cc^/'
(the
"Seller's Agent") as the authorized agent for the Company, for the period of
/ f>
months starting on the
date of execution of this Listing Agreement, and ending at 5:00 P.M. on the / ^U day of J^JLA>~
199 _2 ,
(the "Listing Period"), the Exclusive Rigjit to Sell, Lease, or Exchange certain real property owned by the Seller,
described as: £T7c M
C#6
^
(the
"Property"), at the price and terms stated on the attached board/association property data information form, or at such
other price and terms to which the Seller may agree in writing. The Seller's Agent agrees to use reasonable efforts to
find a buyer or tenant for the Property.
2. BROKERAGE FEE. If, during the Listing Period, the Company, the Seller's Agent, the Seller, another real estate
agent, or anyone else locates a party who is ready, willing and able to buy, lease, or exchange (collectively referred to
as "acquire") the Property, or any part thereof, at the listing price and terms stated on the attached board/association
property data information form, or any other price and terms to which the Seller may agree in writing, the Seller agrees
to pay to the Company a broker fee in the amount of $
^fT
or
£>
% of such acquisition price. The
brokerage fee, unless otherwise agreed in writing by the Seller and the Company, shall be due and payable on the
date of closing of the acquisition of the Property. If a ready, willing, and able buyer is located as provided in this
section above, and the Seller refuses to contract or to close, the Seller shall be obligated to immediately pay to the
Company the brokerage fee listed above. The Company is authorized to share the brokerage fee with another
brokerage participating in any transaction arising out of this Listing Agreement.
3. EXTENSION PERIOD. If within
( ^— months after the termination or expiration of this Listing Agreement, the
Property is acquired by any party to whom the Property was offered or shown by the Company, the Seller's Agent, the
Seller, or another real estate agent during the Listing Period, the Seller agrees to pay to the Company the brokerage
fee stated in Section 2 unless the Seller is obligated to pay a brokerage fee on such acquisition to another brokerage
pursuant to another valid sales agency contract entered into after the expiration or termination date of this Listing
Agreement.
4. SELLER WARRANTIES/DISCLOSURES. The Seller warrants to the Company that the individual(s)/entity listed
above as the "Seller" represent all of the record owners of the Property. The Seller warrants that it has marketable title
and an established right to sell, lease, or exchange the Property. The Seller agrees to execute the necessary
documents of conveyance and to prorate general taxes, insurance, rents, interest and other expenses affecting the
Property to the agreed date of possession. The Seller agrees to furnish the buyer at closing good and marketable title
with a policy of title insurance in the amount of the purchase price. In the event the acquisition includes personal
property, the Seller agrees to sign a Bill of Sale with warranties as to title to the personal property. The Seller agrees
to fully inform the Seller's Agent regarding the Seller's knowledge of the condition of the Property. Upon signing of this
Listing Agreement, the Seller agrees to personally complete and sign a Seller's property condition disclosure
statement. The Seller agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the Seller's Agent and the Company against any claims
which may arise from: (i) the Seller's providing incorrect or inaccurate information regarding the Property; or (ii) the
Seller's failure to disclose material information regarding the Property, including, but not limited to, the condition of all
appliances, heating, plumbing, and electrical fixtures and equipment, sewer, and moisture or other problems in the roof
or foundation, and the location of property lines.
5. AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS. The following is a brief but very important explanation regarding the nature of agency
relationships between the Seller, the buyer, the Company and the real estate agents involved in a sale of the Property.

/

broker is referred to as a Princif. _>roker or a Branch Broker (if the broker^ nas a branch office)
responsible for operation of the brokerage and for the professional conduct of all agents

The broker is

5.2
Right of Agents to Represent Seller and/or Buyer
An agent may represent through the
brokerage, a seller who wants to sell property or a buyer who wants to buy property On occasion, an agent will
represent both seller and buyer in the same transaction When an agent represents a seller, the agent is a "Seller's
Agent', when representing a buyer, the agent is a "Buyer's Agent", and when representing both seller and buyer, the
agent is a "Limited Agent"
5.3 Requirement of Written Agreement. To represent a seller, a buyer, or both, a written agreement is
required Except as provided below, the Principal/Branch Broker also represents whomever the agent represents, and
regardless of whom the agent represents, the agent owes a duty of honesty and fair dealing to all parties to the
transaction
5 4 Seller's Agent. A Seller's Agent works to assist the seller in locating a buyer and in negotiating a
transaction suitable to the sellers specific needs A Sellers Agent has fiduciary duties to the seller which include
loyalty full disclosure, confidentiality diligence, obedience reasonable care, and holding safe monies entrusted to the
agent
5.5 Buyer's Agent. A Buyer's Agent works to assist the buyer in locating and negotiating the acquisition of
a property suitable to that buyer's specific needs A Buyer s Agent has the same fiduciary duties to the buyer that the
Seller s Agent has to the Seller
5.6 Limited Agent. A Limited Agent represents both seller and buyer in the same transaction and works to
assist in negotiating a mutually acceptable transaction A Limited Agent has fiduciary duties to both seller and buyer
However, those duties are "limited" because the agent cannot provide to both parties undivided loyalty and full
disclosure of all information known to the agent For this reason, a Limited Agent must remain neutral in the
representation of a seller and buyer, and may not disclose to either party information likely to weaken the bargaining
position of the other, such as, the highest price the buyer will pay or the lowest price the seller will accept A Limited
Agent must, however, disclose to both parties material information known to the Limited Agent regarding a defect in
the Property and/or the ability of each party to fulfill agreed upon obligations.
5.7 In-House Sale. If the buyer for the Seller's Property is also represented by an agent in the Company, that
transaction is commonly referred to as an "In-House Sale" Most In-House Sales involve limited agency because
seller and buyer are represented by one or more agents in the Company In-House Sales can occur in any of the
following ways
(a) In-House Sale/One Agent. In this situation there is only one agent in the Company involved in
the transaction - that agent represents both Seller and buyer Therefore, the Seller's Agent and the
Principal/Branch Broker are required to (i) act as Limited Agents, and (u) inform the Seller
regarding the limited agency when a buyer, who is also represented by the Seller's Agent, first
expresses an interest in the Property
(b) In-House Sale/Two Agents. In this situation there are two different agents in the Company
involved in the transaction
One represents the Seller - one represents the buyer, and the
Principal/Branch Broker acts as a Limited Agent In such a transaction, the Seller's Agent is required
to inform the Seller regarding the limited agency of the Principal/Branch Broker when a buyer
represented by another agent in the Company, first expresses an interest in the Property
(c) In-House Sale/All Agents. In this situation all agents in the Company, including the
Principal/Branch Broker, represent both the Seller and the buyer as Limited Agents In such a
transaction, the Seller's Agent is required to inform the Seller regarding the limited agency when a
buyer also represented by an agent in the Company, first expresses an interest in the Property
5.8 Conflicts with the In-House Sale. There are conflicts associated with an In-House Sale, for example
agents affiliated with the Company discuss with each other the needs of their respective buyers or sellers Such
discussions could inadvertently compromise the confidentiality of ipf6rmation provided to those agents For that
reason the Company has policies designed to protect the confidentiality of discussions between agents and access
to confidential client and transaction files
^^ij/7/
S
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[ / / ^ T S e l l e r ' s Initials

Date / f r

7/^?£

relationship with the Company
(a) [K] ° n e Agent in the Company. The Sellers Agent and the Principal/Branch Broker
[
]
will represent the Seller
Seller's
Initials

[

1

Seller's
Initials

(b) [ ] All Agents in the Company. All agents in the Company, including the Principal/Branch
Broker will represent the Seller

If 5 9(a) is checked, the Seller authorizes the Seller's Agent or the Principal/Branch Broker to appoint another agent in
the Company to also represent the Seller, in the event the Seller's Agent or the Principal/Branch Broker will be
unavailable to service the Property
5.10 Authorization for Limited Agency. The Seller is advised that the Seller is not required to accept a
limited agency situation in the Company However, it is the business practice of the Company to participate in In-House
Sales In the event the In-House Sale involves limited agency, the Seller agrees to the following (Seller initial
applicable box)
[

]

Seller's
Initials

[

]

Seller's
Initials

[

]

Seller's
Initials

(a) [)(] In-House Sale/One Agent. The Seller's Agent and the Principal/Branch
Broker are authorized to represent both the Seller and a prospective
buyer as Limited Agents
(b) [ ] In-House Sale/Two Agents. The Seller's Agent will exclusively represent
the Seller, another agent in the Company will exclusively represent
the buyer, and the Principal/Branch Broker will act as a Limited Agent
(c) [ ] In-House Sale/All Agents. (Only applicable if 5 9(b) has been selected)
All agents in the Company, including the Principal/Branch Broker,
will represent both the Seller and the buyer as Limited Agents

6. PROFESSIONAL ADVICE. The Company and the Seller's Agent are trained in the marketing of real estate
Neither the Company, nor the Seller's Agent are trained to provide the Seller or any prospective buyer with legal or tax
advice, or with technical advice regarding the physical condition of the Property If the Seller desires advice
regarding (i) legal or tax matters, (u) the physical condition of the Property, or (in) this Listing Agreement, the Seller's
Agent and the Company STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT THE SELLER OBTAIN SUCH INDEPENDENT ADVICE
7. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute, arising prior to or after a closing, related to this
Listing Agreement [ ] SHALL [ X J MAY first be submitted to mediation
If the parties agree to mediation, the
dispute shall be submitted to mediation through a mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the parties Each party
agrees to bear its own costs of mediation If mediation fails, the other procedures and remedies available under this
Listing Agreement shall apply
8. ATTORNEY FEES. Except as provided in Section 7, in case of the employment of an attorney in any matter
arising out of this Listing Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to receive from the other party all costs and
attorney fees, whether the matter is resolved through court action or otherwise If, through no fault of the Company,
any litigation arises out of the Seller's employment of the Company under this Listing Agreement (whether before or
after a closing), the Seller agrees to indemnify the Company and the Seller's Agent from all costs and attorney fees
incurred by the Company and/or the Seller's Agent in pursuing and/or defending such action
9. INFORMATION RELEASE. The Company is authorized to obtain financial information from any mortgagee or
other party holding a lien or interest on the Property
10. MULTIPLE LISTING SERVICE. The Company is authorized and instructed to offer this Property through the
Multiple Listing Service of the X&^CUVT^
k JXJ*IS*^&*ZS<JU^K
board/association of
REALTORS® The Company is further authorized to disclose after closing the final terms and sales price of the
Property
11. KEY BOX. The Company [ 313 [>0 , s N 0 T authorized and instructed to have a key box installed on the Property
The Company [ ] IS [ K ] IS NOT authorized to have a key to the Property The Company \X\ IS [ ] IS NOT
authorized to hold 'Open Houses' at the Property The Seller acknowledges that the Company nas discussed with the
Seller the safeguarding of personal property and valuables located within the property The Seller further acknowledges
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] c Seller's Initials

Date

m

t£r

REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT

TWt i t t >«9«fly beefing contract Ot*h Itw nxjuifvi mi e*Ut» l l t * n * « » to u n tM» form. Buy*r t o d £•*}*<-, how^^r, may atjnw k> «JUr or <toi«U
lt» provision* or to u » * • dTtftgru form, tf you d#ilr« >*gal or t»* *t*v*e«, c*c*"»«ut your attorney of tax advtmor

EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT
Buyer L
otters topuftflaR'the Property
Money, the amount of $_
described
d befov*
befowt a/id hereby d i v e r s to the Brokerage
Brokerage/as earnest Mono*
f/CQt)*^
rtie form of
which,
upon
Acceptance
of
this
otter
by
ait
pefrties
(as
defined
in
Section
23).
UdC
shall be depos/ted in ace
st
Received by:
.(Date)
Brokerage: r^^A^^^t^^A
,
1.

/M^A^y^ ^fcW%5phonaNumber
OFFER TO PURCHASE

-i^-Mf*,

^

PROPERTY

V<rr^^

also descnb9d as

/&*¥* f t/&U

State of Utah (me •Property').
£&*
Includad Items. Unless excluded herein, this sale incJudes the lollowtng itemsrfpresently attached to the Property,

City of

County of.

/#&>

1.1
plumbing, heating, air conditioning fixtures and equipment; ceiling fans; water heater, built-in appliances; lightfixturesand bulbs;
bathroom ffxtures: curtains, graperies and rc>dz\ window and door scions, slum; Juuis* en id WHKJUYHJ, window blinds; awnings;
installed television antenna; satellite dishes and system; permanently affixed carpets; automatic garage door opener and
accompanying transmitter(s); fencing; and trees and shrubs. The following items Sftaji alsc be included in tttj sale and
conveyed under beparjiie Bill of Sale wfth wa^antles as ictltla. ^^^'
/f^A^r^JZ^^^^
JL^trf^Jr*

1.2

Bxclufled Items. The following items are excluded
dxclud from this safe: s9tS<-%*^* - ^^ ^ J ^ T ^

1,3

Water Rights

,J

nduded in this sale:.

^a-^-c

irv5yTA s u r v ^ m a p 9 w6 Propefty certified 6y a licensed surveyor f J WILL ^£] WILL NOT be prepared. The
1.4
Survey.
Property comers [pQ WILL! [ J WILL NOT be marked by survey stakqs set by a licensed surveyor or engineering company.
The cost of the applicable (tims checked above will be: [ ] paid by B u y * ( ] potd by Svlfer [ft mhared equally by Buyer
and S a i l * [ ] Other frptclfy),
For additional terms, see attached Survey Addendum if applicable.
2.

PURCHASE PRICE. The Purchase Price for the Property is S r^jf
2.1 Me

5,

6"&Ty

, d of Payment. The Purchase Pnce will oe paid as tallows:

'/Deo/*
4f.t

7

(a)
,
(b)
'

sc

s'/gteagj

Earnest Monty Deposit. Under cartnln conditions described In thU Contract, THIS
DEPOSIT MAY BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDABLE,
Now Loan. Buyar agrees to apply for a new loan as provWea in Section 2.3. Buyer will apply (or
one or more of the following loans: ( ) CONVENTIONAL { ] FHA [ ] VA
[ ] OTHER (specify)
.
\\ an FHWV t\toar.apples, see attached FHA/VA Loan Wtierrdum.
If the loan is to include any particular terms, then chock below and aive detailr
[ ] SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS

(c) Loan Assumption (sec attached Assumption Addendum if applicable)
Ag\ f e l l e r Financing (^ee atlachpd Seller Fir^ncing Addendum if applicable)
P ^ ( S f T 3 t h e r (specify)
'
£j/^
(f> B«lcno« Q1 Purchase Pr\ci In Cash /it Setttewent (<^

Si:

I

/^^CO>
PH^C I of 6 pnp.v*s

PURCHASE PRICE. Total of lines (a) through (t)

Seller's Initiu

I*K!IB/M-

Dale

5C~

'/7A7

-

-

..

.^^

tw ^/w. o

p.o^/oiiy.

INC.* o u u c i

a^^iz^L^

iuii

responsibility for any loss or dar
., that might result from the use of the ke,
Keybox from any source whatsoever
and agrees to hold the Company and the Seller's Agent harmless from any and all liability as a result of having the key
to the Property and having the keybox installed on the Property. If a tenant occupies the Property on other than a
"nightly rental basis", the tenant agrees to the installation of a keybox and joins in the waiver and release of the Seller's
Agent and the Company as provided above.
(Tenant Signature)
(Date)
12. SIGNAGE. The Company is authorized to place an appropriate sign on the Property.
13. ATTACHMENT. The provisions of the attached board/association property data information form are
incorporated by this reference. In order to complete the property data information form the Seller's Agent may provide
the Seller with a courtesy estimate of the square footage of the Property. As an estimate the square footage figure
shall not be relied upon by the Seller or the buyer in their decision to purchase/sell the Property.
14. EARNEST MONEY DEPOSITS. As part of an offer to purchase the Property, a potential buyer will typically
deliver an Earnest Money Deposit to the brokerage which assists the buyer in preparing that offer. The Company is
hereby authorized and directed to accept on behalf of the Seller, and to hold in its trust account, any Earnest Money
Deposit delivered to the Company by a potential buyer.
15. PRELIMINARY TITLE REPORT. In order to: (i) identify potential title concerns; and (ii) avoid possible delays in
marketing the Property, the Company recommends that the Seller, upon signing this Listing Agreement, authorize the
Company to order a Preliminary Title Report ("PR") on the Property from
(Name of Title Company). The Seller: [
] AUTHORIZES [ X ] DOES NOT AUTHORIZE the Company to
immediately order a PR and [
] ENCLOSES [\£] DOES NOT ENCLOSE a check for the cost of the same.
16. EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITY. The Property will be presented in compliance with Federal, State and local
anti-discrimination laws.
17. FACSIMILE (FAX) DOCUMENT. Facsimile transmission of a signed copy of this Listing Agreement, and
retransmission of any signed facsimile transmission, shall be the same as delivery of an original. If this transaction
involves multiple owners this Listing Agreement may be executed in counterparts.
18. ENTIRE AGREEMENT. This Listing Agreement, including the Seller's property condition disclosure form, and the
attached board/association property data information form, contains the entire agreement between the parties relating
to the subject-matter of this Listing Agreement. This Listing Agreement may not be modified or amended except in

(Seller's Signature)

(Address/Phone)

(Date)

(Seller's Signature)

(Address/Phone)

(Date)

THIS LISTING AGREEMENT shall become effective only upon acceptance by the Company as evidenced by its
signature below.
ACCEPTED by the Company
by
(Authorized Seller's Agent)

by:
(Date)

WHITE: Broker
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(Principal/Branch Broker)

CANARY: Seller's Agent

PINK: Seller

(Date)

2.2
(a)
(b)
2.3
(a)

(b)

Financing Condition, (ohook applicable box)
ft<] Buyer's obligation to purchase the Qroperty IS conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for the appucaoic !oan(s)
referenced in Section 2.1(b) or (r) ;th« "Loan") This condition is referred to as the "Financing Condition •
[ ) Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for e loan. Section 2 3
doasfiot kpply
Application fOf Loan.
Buyer's duties. No later than the Application Deadline referenced in Soctron 24(a) Buyer shall apply for the Loan.
"Loan Application" occurs only when BLyer has (i) completed, signed, and delrvered to the tender (the "Lender")
the inuiai loan appl<catipn and documentation iequ»red by the Lendor: and (u) pajd all loan application lees as
/squired by the Lender *B jycr agrees to diligently work to ootajn the Loan. Buyer will promptly orovide the Lender
witn any addltlqna! documtniUilion as ream red by tho Lender
Procedure If Loan Application Is denied, it buyer receives written irolio* from the Lender that the Lender does
not approve me Loan (a 'loan Denial"), Buyer shall, no later than three calendar days thereafter provide a copy to
Seller. Buyer or Seller may. within three calendar days aftor Seller s receipt of such notice, cancel thrs Contract by
providing wrme-n notice to the other party in the event o< a cancellation under this Section 2.3(D): (i) if the Loan
Dental was 'ecerved by Suyor on or before the Earnest Money forfeiture Deadline referenced in Section 24(d), the
Earnest Money Deposit shall be returned to Buyer; (h) rf the Loan Denial was received Dy Buyer after the Earnest
Money Forfeiture Deadline, Buyer agrees to forfeit, and Seller agrees to accept as Seller's exclusive remedy, the
Earnest Money as liquidated damages A failure to cancel as prnvirifKi in this Section 2.3(b) shall have no effect on
the Financing Condition set forth in Section 2.2(a). Cancellation pursuant to the provisions of any other section of
this Contract slSiali be governed by such other provisions.

2.4
Appraisal o* Property. Buyers obligation to purchase the Propeny [ ] IS £Xf IS NOT conditioned upon the
Property appraising for not less than tha Purchase Pnce If the appraisal condition appiies and the Property appraises for less
than the Purcnaso Price. Buyer may cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Setter no later than rvee calendar days
after Buyer's receipt of nqtice of the appraised value. In the event ot such cancellation, the Earnest Money Deposit shall be
released to Buyer, regardless of whether such cancellation is before or aftor the Earnest Money Forfeiture Deadline A failure
to cancel as provided m this Section 2.4 shall be deemed a waiver of the appraisal condition by Buyer.
I

3. SETTLEMENT AND (CLOSING. Settlement shall take place on or before the Settlement Deadline referenced m Section
24(e). •Settlement" shallioccur only when all of the following have been completed: (a) Buyer and Setter have signed and
defrered to each other or io the escrow/dosing office all documents required by this Contract, by the Lender, by wrnten escrow
inqfriicttnas nr hy appficafife law. to) any monies required to be paid by Buyer under these documents (except for the proceeds
of any new loan) hava been delivered by Buyer to Seller or to the escrow/rmsing ottice in tne form or coiiectao or cieared fund*,
and (c) any monws requ^ed to be paid by Seller under these documents have been doiivered by Sette' to Buyer or to the
escrow/closing office In thfe form ot collected or deared funds. Seller and Buyer shall eadi pay on*-haff (i/?) of the fee charged
by the escrow/closing office for its services in the settlement/dosing process. Taxes and assessments tor the current year,
rents, and interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated al Settlement as set toah in this Section. Tenant doposits
{induding, but not limited jo, security deposits, cleaning deposits and prt?p<*kJ r«uU) shall be paid or credited by Seller to 8uyor
at Settlement Prorations jset torth m this Section snaU be made as of the Settlement Deadline date referenced m Section 24(e).
unttss otherwise agreed tp in writing by the parties. Such wnting could mciuae the settlement statement. The transaction win
be considered closed w'rjen Settlement has been completed, and when all of the following have been completed: (i) the
proceeds of any newioa/n have ^on delivered by the Lender to Seller ui tu ih* oscrow/'docing office; and (M; the applicable
Closing documents have;been recorded in the office otthe county recorder. The actions described m parts (i) and (i<) ot the
preceding sentence shall'be completed within four calendar days of Settlement
4. POSSESSION, Sellfrr shall deliver physical possession to Buyer within- r)y ^ 2 . hours [ ]
[ 1 Other (specify)

days after Closing;

5. CONFIRMATION O f AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the
,1 nz signing
3«yi l i **yi of this Contract:
(
J Seller'sjnitlais
[
] ^ / e f s Initi.-1The Listing Agent, J^Jff^A^
JDMJ^
f ^P\^\^\
Represents ^ S e l l e r [ ) Buyer [ ] boih Buyer and Seller
as a Limited Agent:
represents [ ] Seller f^H Suyor [ ] both Buyer and SHter
i ne Mtttng Agoiu.
/CkJ^&f
as o Limited Agent;

ififi^e;

l*;ifcc 2 t>f t> p a p a

R*»V a/96

Sctlci ' * tnicistts.

Djlc

Him-r's Imiu

UAR Fgnn i

The Ucimg Qtokor
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ropravon:, ( / ] Seller [ ] Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Selli
a8 a
rp
Limited Agen
KJ
j£jtMJ~&5— lepreents [ ] Seller [VBuyer [ ] both Buyer and Selli
y
« o Limited Agen
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Buyer m the amount of mc Purchase Pncc
7. SELLER DISCLOSURES. No latni than the Se'ier Disclosure Deadline rcferoneecjn Section 24(b) Seller shall pruvic
to Buyer the following documents which are uul'cctively iQlorrod to as the 'Seder Disclosures"
(a) a Seller p»opcrty condition uisciosuretortnp Property, signed and dated by Seller.
(b) a commitment lor the policy of title insurance.
(c) a copy oi any lease* aHcctmg (he Property not oxprmg prio' to Closing
(0) wnlicn noi*c** of any claims and/or condemns known to Seder relating to environmental problems and building or zonin
code violations, and
Other
(*psciry) ' c ^ f e & f l & y V ^ ^
f>/flA4/u
'*)
8. BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS. Buyers oblation to purchaso urtdt
this Contract (check applicable boxes)
[ 1 IS DO 'S NOT r"nnr1ir|nnpd npnn Rnyor'q apprnval of thr rnntpnt nf all ThP Splipr riisrinsiirps rpfprpnrpd in Spriinn 7
t>C'S [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer $ aporovai of a physical condition inspection oi the Property,
( ] IS \yQ IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the following losts and evaluation* of the Property, (specify)
If any of the above items acq checked m the affirmative then Sections 8 1 8 2 8 3 and 8 4 apply, otherwise they do not apph
The items checked in the affirmative above are collectively referred lo as the "Evaluations & Inspections." Unless othenms
provided m this Contract, the Evaluations & Inspections shall be paid tor by Buyei and shall be conducted by mdrvtouais c
entities of Buyer's choice. Seller agrees TO cooperate with the Evaluations & Inspections and with the walk-through mspectioi
under Section 11
8.1 Pertod tor Completion and Review of Evaluations and Inspections. No later than the Buyer Canceilalioi
Oeadlme referenced in Sebtion 24(c) Buyer snail (a) complete ad Evaluations & Inspections; and (b) determine if the
Evaluations & Inspections ire acceptable to Buyer
»
B.2 Right to Cancel or Object. If Ruynr dptprmme.s th.it ihp F valuations & Inspections are unacceotabie, Buyer may
no tater than the Buyer Cancellation Deadline, cither (a) cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller, whereupor
the Earnest Money Depos^ *ha!l be released to Buyei cr (b) provide Seller with wntton notice of objections.
8 3 Failure to Respond. I? by the rxpiraiion of the Buyor Cancellation Deadline Buyer dooc not: (a) cancel thic
Contract <is provided m Scjction ft 2 or (b) deliver a written objection to Seller regarding the Evaluations & Inspection*, me
Evaluations & inspections ^hatt be doomed approved by Buyer.
i

8.4 Reepon» by Seller. It Buyer provides written objections to Setter. Buyor and Seller shall have s*ven calendai days
alter Sellers r^cetpi of Buyers objections (the ^Response Penod") in which to agree m wnting upon the manner of resolving
Buyer's oojections Seller fnay. but shall not pp requ.red lo, resolve Buyers objections If Buyer and Seller havo not agreed
m wnting upon ihv mannor 0* reviving Buyers objections Buyei may cancel this Contract by providing wrfrtRn nntmp tn SPMPI
no later than throe calendar days after expuanon of the Response Pfenod, whereupon tnp Earnest Munoy Deposit shall be
releaser! to Buyer, regardless of whether such cancelation is before or after tltr; Farnost Money Forieitu«e Deadline H this
Contract is not canceled by Buyer unrinr in-. Scr.non 3 4, Buyers obj^ciions shall be aeemftd wyivc;n? by Buyer. This waiver
shall not atfw,! tho^c ileitis'wan anted «n Section 10
9.
ADDITIONAL TERMS. There [ ) ARE iV] ARE NOT addend? to this Comma containing additional term:; It thi;./-arc
the lerriii.. of the following addenda arc? inccpcrnpci mio thiv, Contract jy thtu reference [ ] Addendum No.
.
i ] Survey Addendum { 1 Seller Financing Addendum [ ] FHA/VA Loan Addendum ( ] Assumption Addendum
{ ] Lead-Based Paint Addendum (in <;ome transactions this addendum is required by law)
f

] Other (specify)
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10. SELLER WARRANTIES a REPRESENTATIONS.
10.1 Condition of Title. Seller represent ma: Seller has fee i n< lo the Property and will convey good and marketaole
title to Buyer at Closing, by general warranty coed unless the sale is being 'nado pursuant to a real estate contract which
provides tor title to pass af a later date in that case, tide will be conveyed in accordance with the provisions of that contract
Buyer agrees, however, Ao accept title to the Property subject to the following matters of record easements, oaed restnettons. .
CC&R*$ (meaning covenants, conditions and restrictions), and rights-of-way and sublet to ihe contents o' the Commitment
for Tide insurance JS ayreed to by Buyer under Section 8 Buyet also agrees to lake the Property subject lo existing leases
affecting the Property and not expiring pno; to Casing Quycr a^rooi iu be f^pons'Dle for taxes, assessments, nomeownors
association dues, utilities and othe' services provided to tho Property rtftor Closing Except for any Joan(s) specifically assumeo
oy Buyei tinner $^'%tKjn 2 i(c;. Seller will caueo to fcc paid off by Closing ctH rribrtgages. iiubt deeds, judgments, mechanics
liens, lax uent, and warrants. Seiler>vill owis* to nn paro cuirent by Closing all arsoccrnents and homeowners association du«*.
10.2 Condition of Property. Seller warrants That the Propety will be m rhc following conoition ON THE DATE SELLER
DELIVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO BUYER:
(a) tho Property snail be broom-clean and froo of rjehns and personal belongings. Any Seller or tenant rnoving*rolated
damage to the Property shall be repaired at Seller s exppnsp
(b) tho heating cooling, electncal. plumbing arxj sonnklor systems and fixtures and the appliances anc fireplacus will be
in working order and fit for thoir intended purposes.
(c) the roof and foundation shall bo free of leaks kngwn to Seller.
(d) any prrvate wolf or septic tank serving the Propeny shall have applicable perrrnts, ano shall be in Y/orkmg order and
tit for its intended purpose; and
{©) the Property and improvements, including the lancscapmg. wili bo in the same general condition as they were on tfie
date of Acceptance.
11. WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION. Dofore Scttlunwul. Buyer rnuy, upon reasonable notrcs and at a reasonable time.
Conduct a "waik-lhrouqh" inspection of thy Properly to determine only that the Property if: "at represented." meaning that tne
items referenced m Sections 1.1, 8.4 and 10.2 ("the items"}"are respectively present, repaired/changed as agreed, and in the
warranted condition tf the items are not as represented. Seller will, prior to Settlement, replace, correct or reparr the items or.
with the consent of Buyer (and Lender it applicable), escrow an amount at Settlement to provide for the same. The failure to
conduct a walk-through inspection or to cla«m that an item is not as represented, shall not constitute a waivar py Buyer ul lire
nght to receive, on the date pf possession, the items as represented.
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that from the date of Acceptance until the dale of Closing, none of
the following shaft occur without the prior wntlon consent of Buyer: (a) no changes in any existing leases shall be made, (b)
no new leases sliall be entered into, (c) no substantial alterations or improvements to the Property stvatl be made or undertaken,
and (d) no further financial encumbrances to the Property shall be made.
i

13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. It Buye' or Sel'er is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, limited liability lompany, or other
«nnty, : h * person executing this Contract on itc behalf werrants n, $ cr her .authouly lu do so and to bind Buy-jr and Seller
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This Contract together with its addenda, any attached exhibit*, and Seller Disclosures,
constitutes the entire Contract between the parties and supersedes and replaces a n y and ail prior negotiations representations,
warranties, understandings or contracts bOlw<*t?n ihc parties This Contract cannot be changed except by written agreement
of the parties
,
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION.
The parties agree that any dispute. Cuwtg pnor to or after Closing, related to this Contract
[ ] SHALL [J(] MAY (upon rputual agreement of the parties) first be Submitted to mediation tf the parties agree to mediation,
the dispute shall be submitted to mediation through a mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the paities Each pany
agraos to bear rts own costs of mediation U mediation fails, the other procedures and remedies available under this, Conduct
shall apply. Nothing m this Section 1D shall prohibit any party trom seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation
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17.

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS.
17.1 In Action* to Ehforce this Contract, in i h * ev*m of iitrgyiio* or binding arbitration to cnluice mis Contraci ihe
prevailing party snail be pntrtled to costs and reasonahtft atlurnpy (pes Attorney IQPS *.halt not he awarded for participation m
mediation unaer Section ?£.
17.2 1n Interpleader Actions. If ?, pnnap.'tl Orokor holding the E.irnest Money Deposit is required oy taw tc Wo an
interpleader action m court to resolve a dispute wet that Deposii. Buyui and Soiler authorize that principal Dro-ker to araw from
that Deposit an amount neenssary to advance the court costs noedea to bring that interpleader action The amount of the
Deposit remaining alter advancing those costs srv*li he interpleaded into court Buyer at\6 S«liei 'urther agree that whichever
ot them is tound to be m default may bo ordered to pay -my reasonable attorney fees, or additional couri cdst>. incurred by the
principal broker :n tinging trie* action. unless the court frndo that there wa.- fault uu the pan of tht- principal broker of his or her
agent that would make such'an award of attorney fees and cost:; unjust
18. NOTICES. Except as provided ;n Section z:\. an nonces requiied unoer this Contract must be (a) <n anting; (b) signrd
by the party giving notice: and (C) received by the othei party or the other party's agent no later thar> the applicable date
referenced in this Contract
19. ABROGATION. Except tor the provisions of Sections 15 and \7 1 and express warranties nude in mis Contract. the
provisions of this Contract shall not apply after C'osmq
20. RISK OF LOSS. Alt risk of Joss lo the Property not caused b/ Seller or Buyer, including physical damage or destwction
to the Property or its improvements due to any cause except ordinary wear and tear and loss caused by \\ taking m eminent
domain, shall be borne by Seller until Seller delivers possession of tho Property to Buyer.
21. TIME (S OF THE ESSENCE. Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth m this Contiact Extensions must bo
agreed to in writing ny all parties. Unless otherwise explicitly stated in this Contract, (a) performance under each Section of
this Contract which references a date shall absolutely be required by 0:00 PM Mountacn Timo on tnc slated date: and (b) the
term "days" shall moan calendar days and shall be counted beginning on the day following the event which triggers the timing
requirement (i.c . Accoptance, receipt of the Seller Disclosures, etc.;. Performance dates and times referenced harem snail
not be binding uoon title companies, lenders, appraisers and others not parties to this Contract, except as otherwise agreed
to m writing by such non-party.
22. FAX TRANSMISSION AND COUNTERPARTS. Facsimile (fax) transmission of a signed copy of this Contract, any
addenda and counteroffers, fthd the retransmission ot any signed fax shatt be tne same as delivery of an original. This pGOVfilCt
and any *rirlFndj and countorofforu may be eu&uteJ •M v*uu(it«(pv<ns.
23. ACCEPTANCE. "Acceptance" occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer ot the other: (a) signs
the otter or counteroffer whef© noted to indicate acceptance: and (h) communicates to the other party or to the other party's
agent that the Offer or counteroffer has been signed as requirea
24. CONTRACT D E A D L I N E Buyer and Sftitur agiee that the following deadlines shall apply to this Contract:
(a) Application Deadline
No later than Is
calendar d a y * after Acceptance.
(b) Seller Disclosure Deadline
No lat*r than yO calendar days after Acceptance.
(e) Buyer Cancellation Deadline
No later than j u <C calendar days after Buyer's receipt of ell of the
i
Seller Disclosures,
(d) Earnest Money Forfeiture Deadline
_ J T . . calendar days, aper thp Buyer Cancellation Deadline.
(9) Settlement Deadline J
.
ytfazsy^t 1 / /fffiOATE)
25. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Ruyer otters to purchase the Property on th^ahovg»temreand conditions II
Soiler doos not accept this ofjer by ^
P-y>4 ] AM [)(] PM Mountain Time
^ f * r ' ° ^ / * ' "'JJH^T*>- ! 9 ^ •
this offer shall 'apse and I hi? jBrokerag© snail return the Earnest Money Deposit to Buyer

(Buyers Signature)

'

(Offer Date)

(Buyers S«g

T»K> I Ate* of tho »bovc Ofle< Ociicw wh«li bo r^ien-ed lo «s trw 'Otter R«i#rence Dtttc"

{Suyurs1 Names) (PLEASE PRINT)
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ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION
CHECK ONE:
fl^ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE* filler Accepts the forttyoi'ig otti^r on the tyrmc r.nd condition* :>peclfled
ahove.
] CQONTEROFFEffl/Sdlter presents lor Buyers Acceptance me terms of Buyer's offer subject to iho exceptions or
the attached ADDENDUM NQ

_jl/3jf±
("SeHcfrs^tgnature)

~j

(Date)

tbfan Q.fflkL

JttJ* ±*±

(lime")

(Soiled Signature)

(SeWers*
PWNT)
jWers* Names)
Names) (PLEASE
(PLEASE PWNT)

(Dale)

(Notice Address)

(Time)

(Phone)

[ 1 REJECTION: Seller Recocts the foregoing offer
(Seller's Signature)

(Data)

(Time)

(Seller's Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

DOCUMENT RECEIPT
Stale law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seder with copies oi this Contract Deanng an signatures (Ffl m applicable
section below.)
A.

1 acknowledge receipt or la final copy of the forogomg Contract bearing all signatures:

Buyer's Signature)

(Dale)

(Buyer's Signature)

(Date)

Gelled Signature)

(Dutc)

(Seller's Signature)

(Date)

\
I personally caused a final copy of me foregoing Contmci bearing all Signatures to be [ } faxed [ ] malted I
ieiivered on
„
_J
. 19
. postage prepaid, to the [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer.
Sent/DeHvered by {specify)

„

THIS FORM APPROVED 3Y THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE Of THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENEfUL.
£FF€<mVE JUN£ 1 7 , 1 ^ 6 . fT REPLACES ANO SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VEft&OMS OP THIS FORM

I'utti* & u l ' 6 |iitgvs

^0/9r:

Seller's Initials

l>;ilr

i W n n "s h m i . i U

Dull
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APPENDIX "D"

Judgment, Canyon Country Realty v. Mo|il|
entered March 17, 1998" (R. 102B-103BT

GRAND COUNTY LAW & JUSTICE CENTER
Steve Russell, Attorney (USB #2831)
Attorney for the Plaintiff
394 West 400 North
Moab,Utah 84532
Telephone: (801)259-7321

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County, Utah

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FILED

MAR 1 7 1398

FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH

CANYON COUNTRY REALTY,
and COLDWELL
BANKER/ARCHES REALTY,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 9707-96
NELSON MOYLE,
Judge Anderson
Defendant.

The Court having made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the case,
now hereby awards
JUDGMENT, in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Nelson Moyle as
follows:
1.

A commission of $11,100 ($185,000 contract price @ 6%);

2.

Interest at the legal rate of 10% for contracts not specifying a rate of interest from

January 13,1997 to March 3,1998, in the amount of $1,295. See, Sec. 15-1-1, U.C.A.
3.

Plaintiffs' reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred in the action. In this

regard, counsel for the plaintiffs is directed to submit an Affidavit of costs and attorneys fees, and
provide the same to counsel for the defendant for review prior to determination by the Court

4.

Interest on the total Judgment as calculated above at the rate of 9:408% (7.468 +
irU.GA.) from March 3,1998, until paid.

Dated this//_ clay of

/ ^i^Z^

1998.

BY THE COURT

JTHJ/HONORABLE
District Court Judge
Approved as to Form & Content

Leslie Slaugh
Attorney for the Defendant

ix&k

^L
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APPENDIX "E"

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
Copeland v. Moyle. entered March 17, 1998
(R. 191A-203A)

GRAND COUNTY LAW & JUSTICE CENTER
Steve Russell, Attorney (USB #2831)
Attorney for the Plaintiff
394 West 400 North

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT

Moab,Utah 84532

Grand County, Utah

Telephone: (801)259-7321
FILED

MAR 1 7 1998

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH

GEORGE & SHARON
COPELAND,
Plaintiffs,

Findings of Fact &
Conclusions of Law

v.
Civil No. 9707-77
NELSON MOYLE,
Judge Anderson
Defendant.

On March 3, 1997, the Court heard cross-motions for summary judgment The parties
were both present represented by counsel of record. After considering the record, pleadings and
argument of the respective parties, the Court hereby makes and enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The defendant listed certain real property for sale located at 590 North 500 West

in Moab, Grand County, Utah.
2.

On January 7, 1997, George and Sharon Copeland submitted a Real Estate Purchase

Contract for the property through their agent Kelly Stelter of Coldwell Banker/Arches Realty.
3.

The offer was submitted to defendant on January 13, 1997, and accepted in

writing. A copy of the Real Estate Purchase Contract is attached hereto and incorporated by reference.

4.

In accepting the offer, the defendant added the following language to Section 1.2

(Excluded Items) on the Real Estate Purchase Contract,
"All skis, water & snow, bikes, kayaks and other personal sports
equipment not included."
5.

The Court finds that language to be superfluous and of no impact to the accepted

offer since the Buyers had not offered to purchase the excepted items. (This Finding applies even
if, as defendant alleged, some or all of the excepted equipment had been used for rental by
customers of defendants bed & breakfast)
6.

The defendant also inserted his name in Section 5 (Confirmation of Agency

Disclosure) of the Real Estate Purchase Contract
7.

The Court finds this addition was merely disclosure as required by law of the

fact that defendant was, at all relevant times, a licensed real estate agent, and that such disclosure
did not effect the substantive rights or obligations of the Buyers or Seller in the transaction.
8.

Following his acceptance of the Copelands' offer, defendant submitted an

"Addendum No. 1" which purported to increase the price of the property from $185,000 to
$255,000.
9.

Defendant thereafter failed and refused to close the real estate transaction.

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court hereby makes and enters the
following,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendant's acceptance of the Copelands7 purchase offer as set forth above

constitutes a valid and binding contract for the purchase of the real estate.
2.

Defendant's exclusion of personal property which the buyers had not offered to

purchase did not constitute a Counteroffer, as a matter of law.
3.

Defendant's agency disclosure did not impact the contact that had been created

by his acceptance of the Copelands7 purchase offer, as a matter of law.

4.

Defendant breached the real estate contract by failing to close the transaction and

transfer the property.
5.

Based on the foregoing, plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby

GRANTED, and defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED. A further
hearing will be required to determine the nature and extent of damages suffered by the plaintiffs
resulting from defendant's breach of the real estate contract
6.

Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the

action pursuant to Section 17 of the Real Estate Purchase Contract
Dated thisffrday of

ffflo^rM
BY THE COURT

1998.

y j

LIST, -o AGREEMENT & AGENCY ^CLOSURE

REALTOR'

( P A R T A)
THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENT
READ CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING

THIS AGREEMENT is entered into by and between < ^ Q ^ ^ ^
(the "Company") and M«&im^
/i^^y£^

C^c^u^^Zy fc*^£Z^y
(the "Seller")

1. TERM OF LISTING. The Seller hereby grants the Company, including / ^ ^ o t x ^ r
fCsO-^^
(the
"Seller's Agent") as the authorized agent for the Company, for the penod of
/
fa
months starting on the
date of execution of this Listing Agreement, and ending at 5:00 P.M on the / ^
day of IF'JLA-Z
199 7 .
(the "Listing Period"), the Exclusive Rigfit to Sell, Lease, or Exchange certain real property owned by the Seller,

described as JTlC

A,(

Cfit

If,

_

(the

"Property"), at the price and terms stated on the attached board/association property data information form, or at such
other price and terms to which the Seller may agree in writing. The Seller's Agent agrees to use reasonable efforts to
find a buyer or tenant for the Property
2. BROKERAGE FEE. If, during the Listing Period, the Company, the Seller's Agent, the Seller, another real estate
agent, or anyone else locates a party who is ready, willing and able to buy, lease, or exchange (collectively referred to
as "acquire") the Property, or any part thereof, at the listing pnce and terms stated on the attached board/association
property data information form, or any other price and terms to which the Seller may agree in writing, the Seller agrees
to pay to the Company a broker fee in the amount of $
-*£)
or
£>
% of such acquisition price. The
brokerage fee, unless otherwise agreed in writing by the Seller and the Company, shall be due and payable on the
date of closing of the acquisition of the Property. If a ready, willing, and able buyer is located as provided in this
section above, and the Seller refuses to contract or to close, the Seller shall be obligated to immediately pay to the
Company the brokerage fee listed above. The Company is authorized to share the brokerage fee with another
brokerage participating in any transaction arising out of this Listing Agreement.
3. EXTENSION PERIOD. If within
< ^— months after the termination or expiration of this Listing Agreement, the
Property is acquired by any party to whom the Property was offered or shown by the Company, the Seller's Agent, the
Seller, or another real estate agent dunng the Listing Penod, the Seller agrees to pay to the Company the brokerage
fee stated in Section 2 unless the Seller is obligated to pay a brokerage fee on such acquisition to another brokerage
pursuant to another valid sales agency contract entered into after the expiration or termination date of this Listing
Agreement.
4. SELLER WARRANTIES/DISCLOSURES. The Seller warrants to the Company that the mdividual(s)/entity listed
above as the "Seller" represent all of the record owners of the Property. The Seller warrants that it has marketable title
and an established right to sell, lease, or exchange the Property. The Seller agrees to execute the necessary
documents of conveyance and to prorate general taxes, insurance, rents, interest and other expenses affecting the
Property to the agreed date of possession The Seller agrees to furnish the buyer at closing good and marketable title
with a policy of title insurance in the amount of the purchase price In the event the acquisition includes personal
property, the Seller agrees to sign a Bill of Sale with warranties as to title to the personal property The Seller agrees
to fully inform the Seller's Agent regarding the Seller's knowledge of the condition of the Property Upon signing of this
Listing Agreement, the Seller agrees to personally complete and sign a Seller's property condition disclosure
statement The Seller agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the Seller's Agent and the Company against any claims
which may arise from: (i) the Seller's providing incorrect or inaccurate information regarding the Property, or (n) the
Seller's failure to disclose material information regarding the Property, including, but not limited to the condition of all
appliances, heating, plumbing, and electrical fixtures and equipment, sewer, and moisture or other problems in the roof
or foundaton, and the location of property lines
5. AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS. The following is a brief but very important explanation regarding the nature of agency
relationships between the Seller, the buyer the Company and the real estate agents involved in a sale of the propertv

/

broker is referred to as a Priru .1. ^roker or a Branch Broker (if the broke, ^ nas a branch office)
responsible for operation of the brokerage and for the professional conduct of all agents

The broker is

5.2 Right of Agents to Represent Seller and/or Buyer. An agent may represent, through the
brokerage, a seller who wants to sell property or a buyer who wants to buy property On occasion, an agent will
represent both seller and buyer in the same transaction When an agent represents a seller, the agent is a "Seller's
Agent"; when representing a buyer, the agent is a "Buyer's Agent", and when representing both seller and buyer, the
agent is a "Limited Agent".
5.3 Requirement of Written Agreement. To represent a seller, a buyer, or both, a written agreement is
required. Except as provided below, the Principal/Branch Broker also represents whomever the agent represents; and
regardless of whom the agent represents, the agent owes a duty of honesty and fair dealing to all parties to the
transaction.
5.4 Seller's Agent. A Seller's Agent works to assist the seller in locating a buyer and in negotiating a
transaction suitable to the seller's specific needs. A Seller's Agent has fiduciary duties to the seller which include
loyalty, full disclosure, confidentiality, diligence, obedience, reasonable care, and holding safe monies entrusted to the
agent
5.5 Buyer's Agent. A Buyer's Agent works to assist the buyer in locating and negotiating the acquisition of
a property suitable to that buyer's specific needs A Buyer's Agent has the same fiduciary duties to the buyer that the
Seller's Agent has to the Seller.
5.6 Limited Agent. A Limited Agent represents both seller and buyer in the same transaction and works to
assist in negotiating a mutually acceptable transaction. A Limited Agent has fiduciary duties to both seller and buyer.
However, those duties are "limited" because the agent cannot provide to both parties undivided loyalty and full
disclosure of all information known to the agent. For this reason, a Limited Agent must remain neutral in the
representation of a seller and buyer, and may not disclose to either party information likely to weaken the bargaining
position of the other; such as, the highest pnee the buyer will pay or the lowest price the seller will accept. A Limited
Agent must, however, disclose to both parties material information known to the Limited Agent regarding a defect in
the Property and/or the ability of each party to fulfill agreed upon obligations.
5.7 In-House Sale. If the buyer for the Seller's Property is also represented by an agent in the Company, that
transaction is commonly referred to as an "In-House Sale". Most In-House Sales involve limited agency because
seller and buyer are represented by one or more agents in the Company. In-House Sales can occur in any of the
following ways:
(a) In-House Sale/One Agent. In this situation there is only one agent in the Company involved in
the transaction - that agent represents both Seller and buyer. Therefore, the Seller's Agent and the
Principal/Branch Broker are required to: (i) act as Limited Agents; and (ii) inform the Seller
regarding the limited agency when a buyer, who is also represented by the Seller's Agent, first
expresses an interest in the Property.
(b) In-House Sale/Two Agents, in this situation there are two different agents in the Company
involved in the transaction. One represents the Seller - one represents the buyer, and the
Principal/Branch Broker acts as a Limited Agent. In such a transaction, the Seller's Agent is required
to inform the Seller regarding the limited agency of the Principal/Branch Broker when a buyer
represented by another agent in the Company, first expresses an interest in the Property.
(c) In-House Sale/All Agents, in this situation all agents in the Company, including the
Principal/Branch Broker, represent both the Seller and the buyer as Limited Agents. In such a
transaction, the Seller's Agent is required to inform the Seller regarding the limited agency when a
buyer also represented by an agent in the Company, first expresses an interest in the Property
5.8 Conflicts with the In-House Sale. There are conflicts associated with an In-House Sale; for example,
agents affiliated with the Company discuss with each other the needs of their respective buyers or sellers Such
discussions could inadvertently compromise the confidentiality of inf6rmation provided to those agents For that
reason, the Company has policies designed to protect the confidentiality of discussions between agents and access
to confidential client and transaction files
^i/y7 /
^
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[ //rfcFSeHer's

Initials

Date A ( P/^CS*

relationship with the Compan*
[
]
(a) [ K ] 0 n e Ayent in the Company. The Sellers Agent aru the Principal/Branch Broker
Seller's
will represent the Seller.
Initials

[
3
Seller's

(b) [ ] All Agents in the Company. All agents in the Company, including the Principal/Branch
Broker, will represent the Seller.

Initials

If 5.9(a) is checked, the Seller authorizes the Seller's Agent or the Principal/Branch Broker to appoint another agent in
the Company to also represent the Seller, in the event the Seller's Agent or the Principal/Branch Broker will be
unavailable to service the Property.
5.10 Authorization for Limited Agency. The Seller is advised that the Seller is not required to accept a
limited agency situation in the Company. However, it is the business practice of the Company to participate in In-House
Sales. In the event the In-House Sale involves limited agency, the Seller agrees to the following: (Seller initial
applicable box)
[

]

Seller's
initials

[

]

Seller's
Initials

[

]

Seller's
Initials

(a) [ $ '"-House Sale/One Agent. The Seller's Agent and the Principal/Branch
Broker are authorized to represent both the Seller and a prospective
buyer as Limited Agents.
(b) [ ] In-House Sale/Two Agents. The Seller's Agent will exclusively represent
the Seller, another agent in the Company will exclusively represent
the buyer, and the Principal/Branch Broker will act as a Limited Agent.
(c) [ ] In-House Sale/All Agents. (Only applicable if 5.9(b) has been selected)
All agents in the Company, including the Principal/Branch Broker,
will represent both the Seller and the buyer as Limited Agents.

6. PROFESSIONAL ADVICE. The Company and the Seller's Agent are trained in the marketing of real estate.
Neither the Company, nor the Seller's Agent are trained to provide the Seller or any prospective buyer with legal or tax
advice, or with technical advice regarding the physical condition of the Property. If the Seller desires advice
regarding: (i) legal or tax matters; (ii) the physical condition of the Property; or (iii) this Listing Agreement, the Seller's
Agent and the Company STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT THE SELLER OBTAIN SUCH INDEPENDENT ADVICE.
7. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute, arising prior to or after a closing, related to this
Listing Agreement [ ] SHALL [ X 3 MAY first be submitted to mediation. If the parties agree to mediation, the
dispute shall be submitted to mediation through a mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the parties. Each party
agrees to bear its own costs of mediation. If mediation fails, the other procedures and remedies available under this
Listing Agreement shall apply.
8. ATTORNEY FEES. Except as provided in Section 7, in case of the employment of an attorney in any matter
arising out of this Listing Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to receive from the other party all costs and
attorney fees, whether the matter is resolved through court action or otherwise. If, through no fault of the Company,
any litigation arises out of the Seller's employment of the Company under this Listing Agreement (whether before or
after a closing), the Seller agrees to indemnify the Company and the Seller's Agent from all costs and attorney fees
incurred by the Company and/or the Seller's Agent in pursuing and/or defending such action.
9. INFORMATION RELEASE. The Company is authorized to obtain financial information from any mortgagee or
other party holding a lien or interest on the Property.
10. MULTIPLE LISTING SERVICE. The Company is authorized and instructed to offer this Property through the
Multiple Listing Sen/ice of the x&s^zsr^
i ^JJ^yr^^Q^c^cur^y
board/association of
REALTORS®- The Company is further authorized to disclose after closing the final terms and sales price of the
Property.
11. KEY BOX. The Company [ ] I'S [>0 IS NOT authorized and instructed to have a key box installed on the Property.
The Company [ ] IS T>0 I S N 0 T authorized to have a key to the Property. The Company [ ^ ] IS [ ] IS NOT
authorized to hold "Open Houses" at the Property. The Seller acknowledges that the Company has discussed with the
Seller the safeguarding of personal property and valuables located within the Property'. The Seller further acknowledges
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^Seller's Initials

Date

responsibility for any loss or d
. Keybox from any source whatsoever
w - that might result from the use of the k
and agrees to hold the Company and the Seller's Agent harmless from any and all liability as a result of having the key
to the Property and having the keybox installed on the Property If a tenant occupies the Property on other than a
"nightly rental basis", the tenant agrees to the installation of a keybox and joins in the waiver and release of the Seller's
Agent and the Company as provided above.
(Tenant Signature)
(Date)
12. SIGNAGE. The Company is authorized to place an appropriate sign on the Property.
13. ATTACHMENT. The provisions of the attached board/association properly data information form are
incorporated by this reference. In order to complete the property data information form the Seller's Agent may provide
the Seller with a courtesy estimate of the square footage of the Property. As an estimate the square footage figure
shall not be relied upon by the Seller or the buyer in their decision to purchase/sell the Property
14. EARNEST MONEY DEPOSITS. As part of an offer to purchase the Property a potential buyer will typically
deliver an Earnest Money Deposit to the brokerage which assists the buyer in preparing that offer The Company is
hereby authorized and directed to accept on behalf of the Seller, and to hold in its trust account, any Earnest Money
Deposit delivered to the Company by a potential buyer.
15. PRELIMINARY TITLE REPORT. In order to: (i) identify potential title concerns, and (n) avoid possible delays in
marketing the Property, the Company recommends that the Seller, upon signing this Listing Agreement, authorize the
Company to order a Preliminary Title Report ("PR") on the Property from
(Name of Title Company). The Seller: [
] AUTHORIZES [ X ] DOES NOT AUTHORIZE the Company to
immediately order a PR and [
] ENCLOSES [ ^ ] DOES NOT ENCLOSE a check for the cost of the same.
16. EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITY. The Property will be presented in compliance with Federal, State and local
anti-discrimination laws.
17. FACSIMILE (FAX) DOCUMENT. Facsimile transmission of a signed copy of this Listing Agreement, and
retransmission of any signed facsimile transmission, shall be the same as delivery of an original. If this transaction
involves multiple owners this Listing Agreement may be executed in counterparts.
18. ENTIRE AGREEMENT. This Listing Agreement, including the Seller's property condition disclosure form, and the
attached board/association property data information form, contains the entire agreement between the parties relating
to the subject/matter of this Listing Agreement. This Listing Agreement may not be modified or amended except in
writing signeja by the parties her^ra.
ereby agree to the terms of this Listing Agreement.

(Address/Phone)

(Seller's Signature)

(Address/Phone)

(Date)

(Seller's Signature)

(Address/Phone)

(Date)

THIS LISTING AGREEMENT shall become effective only upon acceptance by the Company as evidenced by its
signature below.
ACCEPTED by the Company
by
(Authorized Seller's Agent)

by:
(Date)

WHITE Broker
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(Principal/Branch Broker)

CANARY Seller s Agent

PINK Seller

(Date)
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REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT

T W i I* t toytfty WritUnfl cofSTiCt. Utah Irw r ^ q u l r o r*s1 «*3rt* llc*n*««»» to U M t h b farm. Buy*r #r>d £*il*<, ho»rt*«r, may i y n w lo cftar of ctofeti
I t i provision* Of to w»« • dTtfwrfrtt f o r m . tf you o * i i r * t*gif or tax r W w , con«im your i t t o m t y of tax ftc5vt»or.

EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT

_ZAyrJ(__
^
. otters topuWaSe'the Property
jescrtbed below a/Id
a/id har&by
hereby d^iv<
described
dQ^ver.3 to ihe 5rote'age/&3 tamest Money, the amount of s ^ n j M t ^ ^ ^ V ? " ^ ^ ^ ^ *orm ol
. which, upon Acceptance of this otter Dy ail parties (as defined in Section 23).
thail be deported
:n acrarriapee \
shall
depoa
st
Received by.

. on _ _

Brokerage: / ^ # < J £ * r f

K/AXJ&A/AkA^fisi

; ,
PROPERTY; ^ / f f
also described asC»Y of

jfe*J%*iPbcne
OFFER TO PURCHASE

&^JS<^^

/

*'
^* ^ ^ v ^ L x * ^ (C^^^A^^^

?%Z2«^&^

^ r —^y

County of

>>£-£-#*
^ J ^
^

£

<X<?Z

y

S*+IO AS Z&J* tjj
T
J ^ u^J

.{Date)

Number - ; <<2 •
&*„

l—

jc
^ / /£S>- ^L^^^ L ^ T w ^ r ^ > - ^ 7 ^
State of Utah (the •PnDporcy').

-

1.1
Indudad ftems.1 Unless excluded herein, this sale incudes the followTng items it presently attached to Ihe Property
piumDing. heating, air conditioning fixtures and equipment; ceiling fans; water heater, built-in appliances; light Sxtures and bulbs
bathroom fixtures: curtains,^draperies zt\4 rsdz; window and door 6cr*£ns, slum! duui* and windy***, window Winds; awnings
installed television antenna; satellite dishes and system; permanently affixed carpets; automatic garage door opener and
accompanying transmftter(s); fencing; and trees and shrubs. The fallowing items shaJJ aisc bo included in ttts sale and
conveyed wider separate gill %\ Sale wHh vragantles as ia title; ^ f f ^^^^^JZ^l^^tr''
Ff^^^f^xt

lufled Itema. The following
jwing items are exclud
jded from I

1,3

•tar Right*. The following water rights ajajnduded in this'sale; ^B0**&Witor

•—••

" ^ ^ j ^ f i ^

1.4
Sutve^. A survcj/map 9 W& Property certified 6y a licensed surveyor [ ] WILL \jQ WILL NOT be prepared. The
Property comers [pQ WILL! [ J WILL NOT be marked by survey stakes set by a licensed surveyor or engineering company.
The cost 0? me applicable items checked above will be: [ ] paid by B u y * [ ] p«id by Svllvr [tf) mhervd equally by Buyer
a n d S a I l * r [ ] Other Specify)
j
. For aadttlonai terms, see enached Survey Addendum if applicable.
2.

PURCHASE PRICE, The Purchase Pnce for the Property is S,
d of Payment. The Purchase Pnce win oe paid as follows:
*f£r

(a) Eornest Monty Deposit Under certain conditions described In thl* Contract, THIS
DEPOSIT MAY BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDABLE.
(b) N«w Loan. Buyor agrees to apply for a rtew loan as provideo: in Section 2.3. £uy«r will apply lor
one or tnoro of the foilowino loans: ( } CONVENTIONAL { ] FHA [ } VA
; [ ] OTHER (specify)
': If an FHA/VA loan applies, see attached FHA/VA Loan Addendum.
! If the loan is to include any particular terms, then check below and oive detailr-:
1
[ ] SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS

sc

5__

z
B. /tfdfi**.

(c) Lo«n Assumption (sec a^achQd Assumption Addendum if applicable)
ip\ 5^llor Financing (see auac^pd
ac^pd Sailer Financing Addendum if ap^piijaWe)

^ {t) B«lcno« of Purchaw Pric i In Cash *t Settlemeot

Pii^r 1 ufO pnp.vs

a«viv9«

/

i ^

' ^i^€^fl/^U^

PURCHASE PRICE. Total n< lines (a) through (t)

Seller's Initial:

\>«*!IB/MDEPOSITION
EXHIRIT

5C~

1

UAP Form f

2.2
(a)
(b)

Financing Condition, (ohook applicable boi)
$<3 Buyers obligation to purchase tKe Droper^/ IS conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for the appticaoic loan(s;
referenced in Section 2 Kb) o- (r) 'thn "Loan") This rendition is referred to as fie "ciruncang Condition "
[ ] Buyer's obligation to pu«c/ioso (ho Property fS NOT conditioned upon Suyer qualifying for £ Joan Section 2 3
doos^not apply
i

2.3
(a)

(b)

Application fOf Loan.
Buyer's duties. No later than the Appitcatior Deodlme referenced m Soctron ?4{a) Buyer shall apply for the Loan
"Loan Application" occurs only when BLver has (0 completed bigned and deirvered to the tender (the "Lender")
the trwiial loan application and documentation lequrred by the Lendor *rd (u) pajd all loan application lees as
/squired by the Lender Bdycr agrees to diligently wcrk to ootem the Loan. Buyer will promptly provide the Lender
witn any additional docum*nUliun as reouired by no Lender
Procedure It Loan Application 1$ denied, it buyet receives written rtuitu* from the Lender that the Lonoer does
not approve tne Loan (a "Loan Denial"). Buyer shall, no later than three calendar days thereafter provide a copy to
Seller Buyer or Seller may within three calendar days aftor Seller s receipt of such notice, cancel this Contract by
providing wrmen notice to the other party in the event of a cancellation under this Section 2.0(b) 0) »* the Loan
Denial was <ecervecl by Buyer on or before the Earnest Money Forfeiture Deadline referenced ir Section 24(d), the
Earnest Money1 Deposit shall be returned to Buyer, (n) rf the Loan Denial was received Dy Buyer after the Earnest
Money FortemJre Deadline, Buyer agrees to iorleit, and Seller agrees to accept as Seller's exclusive remedy, the
Earnest Money as liquidated damages A failure to rancel as provided in this Section 2.3(b) shall have no effect on
the Financing Condition set forth m Section 2 2(a) Cancellation pursuant to the provisions of any otter section of
this Contract shad be governed oy such other provisions.

2.4 Appraisal of Property. Buyer * oWgation to purchase the Property [ J IS £Xj IS NOT conditioned upon the
Property appraising for not less than thw Purchase Pace if ma appraisal condition applies and the Property appraises for less
than the Purtnaso Pnce. Buyer may cancel this Contract Dy providing written notice to Seller no later than t v e e calendar days
after Buyer's receipt of notice of the appraised value In the event crt such cancellation, the Earnest Money Deposit shall be
released to Buyer, regardless of whether such cancellation ts before or aftor the Earnest Money Forfeiture Deadline A failure
to cancel as provided trt this Section 2 4 shall be deemed a waiver ol the appraisal condition by Buyer.

i
3. SETTLEMENT AND CLOSING. Settlement shall take place on or before the Settlement Deadline referenced m Section
24(0) •Settlement" shall!occur only when all of tne following have been completed: (a) Buyer and Sefter have signed and
deivered to oacn other or io the escrow/dosing office alt documents required by this Contraci. by the Lender, by written escrow
irrtniftinm nr by apphcaae law. fb) «ny monies required to be paid by Buyer under tnose documents (except for me proceeds
ol any new lean) hava been delivered by Buyer to Seller or to the escrnvwrarvung ottice in tne torm o* coueaao or cieated fuiid*,
and (c) any monies required to be paid by Seller under those documents have been delivered by Sette' to Buyer or to the
escrow/closing office In thfe form of collected or cleared funds Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-naif (1/2) of the tee charged
by the escrow/closing office for its services m the settiement/dosmg process. Taxes and assessments tor the current year
rents, and interest on assumed obligations shall bo prorated al Settlement as set forth in this Section. Tenant deposits
(including, but not hrmted fo, security deposits, cleaning deposits and prt**»*d I « I I U ) »haJi be paid or credited by Seller to Buyoi
at Settlement Prorations set forth m this Section snotf be made as of the Settlement Deadline date referenced m Section 24(e)
unless otherwise agreed tp in writing by the parties Such wnting could mciuoe the settlement statement. The transaction wit
be considered closed w»)en Settlement has been completed, and when all of the following have been completed (i) the
proceeds of any new loam have been uobvervd by the Lender to Seller w lu ih* owow/clocing office; and (»/ the applicable
Closing documents have .been recorded m the offcee of the county recorder. The actions dc^enbed m parts (i) and (u) ot the
preceding sentence shall'be completed wrthm four calendar days of Settlement
4.

I

POSSESSION, 5>rtlpr shall deliver physical possesion to Buyer within- [)6 ^L
] Other (specify) _ _ L _ .
_.:.

hours [ ]

clays after Closing

S
CONFIRMATION O f AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the bigninq of this Contract
»rJs Initials
[
] 9^/er's
Initials
J Seller's
Saver's Initia
(
The Listing Agent
l nc betting Agenl.

yf^r>^V

I'.ifcv 2 of *> p*ue*

n**va/96

) Buyer [ ] boih Buy*r and Sells
es a Limited Agenl
roproocntr, [ ] Seller (VI Buy or [ J both Buyer and SHIP
HU o Limited Agenl

Sctk'i \ lni(j.iU_

DJU

^AR Fonn

The Lictuiy Cjioko*.

The Selling Broker.

J\^*t
~
^k^tMJ^O—-

$~C4^fi

/

copravon:-, [^Seller [ ] Buyer ( ] hoih Ruyer and Selh
.
as a Limited Agen
represents [ 1 Seller f V o u y e r ( ] both Buyer and Sefli

~

uo a

limited Agen

\/\ litlc ii i3vi:ai iv>e ntjuiii

Buyer in me aniount of the Purchase Pncc.
7.
SELLER DISCLOSURES. No utsr than the Seller Disclosure Deadline rcforonceclin Section 24(b). Seller shall pruvic
to Buyer tno following documents which cue collectively iGlurrou io as the 'Seller Discipsures"
(a) a Seller property condition lii^cto^nre -or tn« Property, signed and.dated by Seller;
a commitment for rhe policy of title insurance;
(c) a copy of y.ny loasos affecting (he Property not expiring prior to Dosing,
«H wnltcn noi'C^ of any dRims and/nr conditions known to Seller relating to environmental problems and building or zonir
code violation^ and ;
, x
Or— ^
i=H___^Lw~-^^/
/->
j
* ,,
(e) Oth&r (£p*cify)
_,,,,,, ^ ^ ^
.. _ _
,_
8.

BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS. Buyer's objpation to purchaso utxJi

this Contraci (check applicable boxes).
[ 1^
foC'S
( ] IS

DO ^ NOT rnnriirlnnpd upon Ruyor'q appmva\ nf thr rnntpni nf nil Vnp Spllpr nisrinsurpq rpfpfpnrpd infcprtmn7"
[ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a physical condition inspection of me Property;
^ } IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the following iosts and evaluations of the Property: (specify)

It any of the above itoms ar$ checked in the affirmative, then Sections 8 1 8.2. 8 3 and 8.4 apply; otherwise they do not appl'
The items checked in the affirmative above are collectively referred to as the "Evaluations & Inspections." Unless othenms
provided in this Contract, the Evaluations & Inspections shall be paid for by Buyer and shall be conducted by individuals <
entities of Buyer's choice. Setter agrees to cooperate with the Evaluations & inspoctions and wcth the walk-through inspectio
under Section .11.
8.1
Period tor Completion and Review of Evaluations and Inspections. No later than the Buyer CanceHatio
Oeadline referenced in Section 24(c) Buyor snail, (a) complete atf Evaluations & Inspections; and (b) determine if th
Evaluations & Inspections are acceptaoie to Buyer.
B.2 Right to Cancel or Object. If Ruynr n>tf?rmtnf*js th.it ih* Fvaluations & Inspections are unacceotabie, Buyer ma\
no later than the Buyer Cancellation Deadline, cither, (a) cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Setter, whereupo
the Earnest Money OcposH shall be released to Buyer, or (b) provide Seller with written notice of objections.
83
Failure to Respond. K by the expiration ol the Buyor Cancellation Deadline. Buyer dooc not: (a) cancel thi
Contract as provided in Section # 2. or (b) deliver a written objection to Seller regarding the Evaluations & inspoctions. th
Evaluations & inspections ihatt be doomed approved by Buyer.
8.4
Reeponsa by Seller. If Buyer provides wnnen objections to Seller. Buyor and Seller shall have s-sven calendar day
alter Seller's receipt of Buyer's objections (iho "Response Penod') in which to agree in wnting upon the manner of resotVim
Buyer's oojections. Seller may. but shall nor be requ.red to, resolve Buyer's objections if Buyer and Seller havo not agrees
m wnting upon triv manner &>f resolving PuyCTs objections. Buyer may cancel this Contraci by providing wrrrmn nottr.n in s^iif!
no later than three calendar days after expiration of the Response Period, whereupon tne Earnest Murray Deposit shall b<
released to Buyer, regardless of whether such cancellation is before or after the* Earnest Money Forfeiture Deadline. It ihr
Contract is not canceled by Buyer wndnr ih**. Section 6 4, Buyers objections shall be aeemt>d waived by Buyer. This waive
shall not tiHf;tf those items', wan anted «n Section 10
9.
ADDITIONAL TERMS. Thcro [ ] ARE §(] ARE NOT addenda !othir. Co.mac! containing additional lorn.-; if iht;:/* ,irr;
Uic term* of the following addenda are ineo«pcr)fierj mio this Contract jy this reference [ ] Addendum No.
t 1 Survey Addendum {= 1 Seller Financing Addendum [ ] FHA/VA Loan Addendum [ ] Assumption Addcndun
{ ] Lead-Based Paint Addendum (in some transactions this addendum is required by taw)
f J Other (specify)
._.

V
\
H n v f)f'.H,

/
I

S j A f < ' »-.si« '

10

SELLER WARRANTIES & REPRESENTATIONS
10.1 Corrdltion of Title, Seller represent ma: 5^'cr ^as (ee \ n< to the Property ana will convey good and marketaofe
title to Buyer at Closing by general warranty coed unless the sale »t> being made pursuant to a real estate contract which
provides lor title to pass af a later dare in (Nat v.ase title will be conveyed in accordance with the provisions of that contract
Buyer agrees, however, Ac accept title to the Property sub)ecf to the following matters of record easements oeed restnettons.
CC&R'$ (meaning covenanrs condrrions and rostncitons) ard right-, of w<iy and subject to the contents o- the Commitment
for Title Invursnce JS ayreea to by Buyer unfac Soction 8 Buyei also agrees to take the Property subject 10 existing leases
affecting I ho Property and not expiring prior to Casing Ouycr a^roos iv be 'e;>coni><olc for taxes, assessments, homeowners
association dues, utilities and otne' services provided TO the Property i:u;r Closing Except for any loan(s) specifically assumeo
oy Buyfti tinriPt .?f»,%t»on 2 He/. Seller win cau^o to be paid off by Closing ciH mortgages, tiubi Uetrdb judgments, mechanics
hens, tax i;ena» and warranto, SellerjwiJi cnusp to no pate curent by Closing all weoexments arxj rtomeowners association du«>.
10.2 Condition of Property. Seller warrants mat t*c Property will be m the following condition ON THE DATE SELLER
DELIVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO BUYER.
(a) mo Property shall be broom-clean and trco of denns and personal belongings. Any Snllpr nr t^na'tt moving^rolaied
damage lo the Property shall be repaired at Seller s expend
(b) Tho heating cooling, electncal. plumbing <i<)d sonnklor systems ann fixtures and the appliances anc fireplaces will be
in working order and fit lor thoir intended purposes.
(c) the roof and foundation shall bo free of leaks Known to Seller.
(d) any prrvate wot! or septic tank serving the Property shall have *pui«cat>ie permits, ano shall be in Y/orXing order and
tit for its intended purpose; and
(e) the Property and improvements, including the lancscapmg. wili bo in the same general condition as tney were on the
aate of Acceptance.
11. WALKTHROUGH INSPECTION. Oofore Setttenwni. Buywi fnity, upon reasonable notice ana at a reasonable time
conduct a 'walk-through - inspection of tho Properly to determine only thai me Property »c "a«, represented.- meaning that tne
items referenced in Sections 1.1, 8.4 and 10.2 ("the items") "are respectively present, repaired/changed as agreed, andm the
warranted condition If the items are not as represented. Seller will, prior to Settlement, replace, correct or reparr the items or.
with the consent of Buyer (and Lender if applicable), escrow an amount at Settlement to provide for the same The failure to
conduct a walk-through inspection or to clmm that an item ie not as reprocontcd, shall not constitute a waiver by Buy«r ul tire
nght to receive, on the date gf possesion, the items as represented.
12- CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that from the date of Acceptance until tne dale of Closing, none of
the following shaft occur without the prior wntton consent of Buyer (a) no changes in any existing leases shall be made, (b)
no new leases sliall be entered into, (c) no substantial alterations or improvements to the Property stvttl be made or undertaken,
and (d) no further financial encumbrances to the Property shall be made.
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. 11 Buyer or Sel'e' is a ccporafcon. partnership, trust, estate, limited liability company, or other
entity, The parson executing this Contract on itc behnif warrants hi* or her authouiy lu du so and to bind Buy-*r and Seller
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This Contract together with its addenda, any attached cxlubilb. and Seller Disclosures
constitutes the entire Contract between the parties and supersedes znd replaces any and all prior negotiations representations
warranties, understandings or contracts buiwei*rt ihe parties This Contract cannot be changed except by written agreement
of the parties
,
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION.
The parties agree thai any dispute. a i w t g prior to or after Closing, retatej to mis Contract
( ) SHALL [j(] MAY (upon rnutual agreement of the parties) first bfc Submitted to mediation If the parties acree to mediation
the dispute shall be submitted to mediation through a mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the paittes each pany
agrees to bear its own costs of mediation It mediation fails, the other procedures and remedies available under thn, Coniruri
shall apply. Noth.ng in this Section 1S shall prohibit any party from seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation
16. DEFAULT, if Buyer defaults, Seller may elect onher to retain the Earnest Money Dvposit .is iiqutoated damages or to
•Kturn it and sue Buyer to specifically enforce tin* Contract or pirsue other remedies available at law If Seller defaults m
.addition to return of me Earnest Money Deposit Quyer may elect either to accept from Seller a sum equal to the Earnest Money
Deposit as Mqutdated carnages, or niay *ue 5vli*r to specifically enforce thr, Contract or pursue other remf-dios available tit
iw II Buyer clot.'* to 4ornpj hquidaien dninaoes Seller <igrep^ to ujy the ii:juid«ned damages to Buyer upon demand u •*.,
j
greed that denial of u Loan App'^ation madr/7>> thcAJwyei" «•> not A dcUutt and is governed hy Section 2 3(h)

)*Mr.r 4 <if ft |I.IKI-N

Seller"* I n i t i a l / / y ( y f

P H U ' / / Jj / /

llim-r'* h>iU^U fy ' & .

5c

<^*
M V v (VGA

i>Mtr J_/„7//

/

Wifi
\^AM Put.,

17. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS.
17.1 In Action* to Errforce tn>a Contract, in ' n * evpni of iitrqono- or ^mrjing arbitration to cr»fu;ce mis Conlraci th
provaiiing parly snail be jpntrtlod to costs ond rea^onamo .v.iurnpy fo«>^ Attorney in^s r.haP no' he av/arded for participation i
mediation unuer Section ?£.
17.2 In Interpleader Actions. If ?. ;}/<nop.\| Orokor huld»r,<] the Earnest Money Deposit is required Dy taw to t>K". a
interpleader action m court to resolve a dispute -JJQ\ that Deoosd. Buyu und Soiler a u t h o r s ihar pnntipai ba-ker to draw fro«
that Deposit an amount neenssary to advance the court ousts needed to bring that interpleader action Tne amount o-f th<
Deposrt remaining alter advancing those costs srvni he interpleaded into cwurt E3uyur and Seltet 'urther agree that whichever
of them »s found lo be m default may bo ordered lo pay .jny reasonable attorney lees, or addition^ court edsty. incurred by thi
principal brokor :n bringing th'n action, unless the court hndo that there wa$ lault un the pan of tht- principal broker ortosor h<?
agent that would make such'an awara of attorney tecs and costs unjust
18. NOTICES. Excep! as provided ;n Section z:). an nonces requited unoer this Contract must be. (a) m anting; (b) signpr
by the party giving notice: and ( 0 received by the othe* party or the other party's agent no later rhan the- applicable date
referenced in this Contract
19. ABROGATION. Except tor the provisions of Sections 15 and !7 1 and ezptetts warranties mude in rats Contract, Ihc
provisions of this Contract shall not apply after C'osmg
20. RISK OF LOSS. AH risk of loss to the Property not causod by Seller or Buyer, including physical damage or destruction
to the Property or its improvements due to any cause except ordinary wear a/id tear and loss caused by a taking m eminent
domain, shall be borne by Seller until Seller delivers possession of the Property to Buyer.
21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this Contiact. Extensions must Do
agreed to in writing ny at) parties. Unioss otherwise explicitly slated in this Contract, (a) performance under each Section of
this Contract which references a date shall absolutely bo required by 0:00 PM Mountain Timo on tnc slated (fate: and (b) the
term "days* shall moan calendar days and shall be counted beginning on the day following the evgnt which triggers the taming
requirement (i.e.. Accoptance, receipt of the Seller Disclosures, olc.;. Performance dates and times referenced herein snail
not be binding uoon title companies, lenders, appraisers and others not parties to this Contract, except as otherwise agreed
to m writing by such non-party.
22. FAX TRANSMISSION AND COUNTERPARTS. Facsimile (tax) transmission of a signed copy of thts Contract, any
addenda and counteroffers, and the retransmission of any signed tax shaU be tne same as driven/ of an original. This Q^nirgtCl
ami any *rtn>nd«i ana eountorofforu moy be ^>:6cutwJ
23. ACCEPTANCE. "Acceptance" occurs whan Suiter or Buyer, responding to an offer or cuunteroffet of trie other (a) signs
the otter or counteroffer whe(e noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or to the other parly's
agont that the otter or counteroffer has been signed as required
24.
(a)
(to)
(e)

CONTRACT DEADLINES* Buyer and Sftttur agiee ihut the following deaolines shall apply to this Contract:
Application Deadline
No later than Is
calendar days after Acceptance.
Seller Disclosure Deadline
No lat*r than sO calendar days afttr Acceptance,
Buyer Cancellation Deadline
No later than ju <£ calendar days after Buyer's receipt of all of the
Seller Disclosures.
(d) Earnest Money Forfeiture Deadline
^J5„ calendar daya rter thp Buyer Cancellation Deadline.
(e) Settlement Deadline '
y^L^^i 1 J /VfpDATE)
25. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Ruyer offers to purchase the Property on t h ^ h c v ? lermsand conditions It
Softer does not accept this ofler by. ^
P"^>4 1 A W \£\ P M Mountain Tims
=9SSg5cSS5^^
19 ^?""3this offer shall lapse, and I he (Brokerage snail return the Earnest Money Deposit to Bu,
._ .,

(Bt/yer's Signature;}

y

(Offer Date)

(Buy^T^ Signature)

(OUor Daip)

Tl«*' later of tho above OJitr* O.MCt **M< bo referred to «s trw "Otter R«i#*cnce Out* -

(Buyurs'Names) (PLEASE P R I N T )

V\\%v * »Th p.iui-

Seller'* lnlii.»U

//

/

f

'
Mtw6/90

/

'

iNiV.ir* AOcJross)

{) iW

'

'P ^

I r~

!iu>rr N

'

(Pliunr)

l»itl»'l> ^ ? / £ ,

^>L

t>ulv / /

//_?7

//7/f?

ACCEPT ANCE/C0UNTF.R0FFEP/REJECTION
CHeCK ONE:
&M»er Acceu's the forp'jo,nn nftnr on ^e t^rrnc r.nc car\W<*** specified

(X^ACCEPTANCE OF OFFcR TO PURCHASE
anove

i ] COUNTEROFFER]/golfer presents lor Buyers Acceptance tne terms of Buyer's ofier subject 10 ih(: exceptions o?
' '"jrcatipw a s ^ / c t f e a in the attached ADDENDUM NO

(SeOsFsStgnature)

1

4o&£J*J&^^
(limp)

(Date)

(SeWers* Names) (PLEASE PWNT)

(Sellers Signature)

(Dale;

(Notice Address)

(Time;

(Phone

[ ] REJECTION: Seder Rejects the foregotrg off»r

(Seer's Signature)

(Date)

rTime)

(Sellers Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

DOCUMENT RECEIPT
State law requires Broker to furnish Buyvr and Seller with copies of this Contract beanng all signatures (Ffl m applicable
section below)
A

I acknowledge receipt 0! & final copy of tne foroyoing Contract bearing all signatures:

Buyer's Signature)

(Date)

(Buyers Signature)

(Dcto)

Ceiled Signature)

(Oute)

(Seller's Stgnature)

(Date)

\
1 personally caused a final copy of tne :OTOQO«»X} Contract bearing all Signatures to be [ ] faxed { ] malted [
.elivered on
.
. 19
. postage prepaid, to the [ } Seller [ } Buyer
Sent/Defcvered by ^specify)

_

m

THtS PORM APPROVED 8Y THE UTAH SEAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OP TH6 UTAH ATTORNC? GENERAL.
SFFECT1VH JUME 1?, 199$. n REPLACES ANO SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS 0 * TKfS POftM

t'uuc <% ol c> pagvN

Seller's IttthnN

D.ilv

M I I M I \ Inin.iU

\)j\K

] hand

APPENDIX "F"

Judgment, Copeland v. Movie, entered March
17, 1998 (R. 204A-205A)

GRAND COUNTY LAW & JUSTICE CENTER
Steve Russell, Attorney (USB #2831)
Attorney for the Plaintiff
394 West 400 North
Moab,Utah 84532
Telephone: (801)259-7321

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County, Utah
FILED

MAR 1 7 1998

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH

GEORGE & SHARON
COPELAND,
I

JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
v.
Civil No. 9707-79*
NELSON MOYLE,
Judge Anderson
Defendant.

The Court having made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the case,
now hereby awards
JUDGMENT, in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Nelson Moyle as
follows:
1.

Plaintiffs' reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred in the action. In this

regard, counsel for the plaintiffs is directed to submit an Affidavit of costs and attorneys fees
following the hearing for determination of plaintiffs' damages, and provide the same to counsel
for the defendant for review prior to determination by the Court
2.

Interest on any amount of damages found to have been caused by defendant's

breach of the contract at the legal rate of 10% for contracts not specifying a rate of interest, from
January 13,1997 to March 3,1998. See, Sec. 15-1-1, U.CA.

•7, -H^to •&<
3.

Interest on the total Judgment as calculated above at the rate of 0.468% (7.468 4

5% T ^H»uailt^©e745=* : 4rU.CA.) from March 3,1998, until paid.

Dated this iZciay of _

^1998.
BY THE COURT

»MJs„_
JORABLE LYLE ANDERSON
Dfetfict Court Judge
Approved as to Form & Content

Leslie Slaugh
Attorney for the Defendant

Mailing Certificate
This is to certify that true and correct copies of Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of fact
Conclusions of Law and Judgments in Civil 9707-77 & 9707-96 were mailed, postage prepaid to
defendant's counsel, LESLIE SLAUGH, P.O. Box pASTTrovo, Uteh) 84603.

3fa ft?

APPENDIX "G"

Order, Canyon Country Realty v. Moyle.
entered May 6, 1998 (R. 126B-127B)

GRAND COUNTY LAW & JUSTICE CENTER
Steve Russell, Attorney (USB #2831)
Attorney for the Plaintiff
394 West 400 North
Moab,Utah 84532
Telephone: (801)259-7321

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County, Utah

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

F1LED

MAY - 6 1998

FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH

CANYON COUNTRY REALTY, and
COLDWELL BANKER/ARCHES
REALTY,

ORDER

Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil No. 9707-96

NELSON MOYLE,
Judge Anderson
Defendant.

On March 17, 1998, the Court entered a Judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and
directed plaintiffs counsel to submit an Affidavit in support of an award of costs and
attorneys' fees. The Affidavit was submitted on April 20,1998. The time having passed
for a response or objection to the request for costs and fees, and the amounts set forth in
the Affidavit of plaintiffs' counsel appearing reasonable and necessarily incurred, good
cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the Judgment in the above entitled case, made
and entered on March 17, 1998, shall include costs of $465.05 and attorneys' fees of
$3,105. The total Judgment as of March 17, 1998, is therefore $16,095.05, which
amount shall accrue interest at 7.468% until paid.

Dated t h i s ^ d a y of P ^ \

, 1998.

By The Court

4^—

Tb^Honorable Lyle R. Anderson
District Court Judge

APPENDIX "H"

Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law,
Copeland v. Moyle. entered August 5, 1998
(R. 225A-233A)

GRAND COUNTY LAW & JUSTICE CENTER
Steve Russell, Attorney (USB #2831)
Attorney for the Plaintiff
394 West 400 North
Moab,Utah 84532
Telephone: (801)259-7321

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County, Utah
FILED

AU6 - 5 1998

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH

GEORGE & SHARON COPELAND,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Findings of Fact &
Conclusions of Law
Civil No. 9707-77

NELSON MOYLE,
Judge Anderson
Defendant.

On March 17, 1998, the Court granted plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
on the claim that defendant had breached a Real Estate Purchase Contract for land and
improvement located at 590 North 500 West in Moab, Grand County, Utah.
On July 13, 1998, after allowance for further discovery by all parties, a hearing
was held to determine the nature and extent of the Copelands' damages, if any, arising
from the breach of contract. All parties were present represented by counsel of record.
The plaintiffs offered several alternative theories for recovery including benefit of the
bargain, lost business profits, lost personal income and other consequential damages.
During the course of the hearing, the plaintiffs elected to pursue only the benefit of the
bargain claim for damages. Based on the sworn testimony, exhibits offered and accepted
and argument of counsel, the Court hereby makes and enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The defendant Nelson Moyle breached a contract with the plaintiffs for the

sale of real property and improvements located at 590 North 500 West in Moab, Grand
County, Utah.
2.

The Court finds that the property and assets purchased by the plaintiffs is

limited to that specifically set forth in the Real Estate Purchase Contract that was
executed by the parties.
3.

In this regard, the Court finds that the existing telephone lines at the time

of the purchase were not intended to be purchased by the plaintiffs, were not intended to
be sold by the defendant and were not included in the sale.
4.

Randy Day is a long-time real estate broker and agent in Moab, and acted

as the selling agent for Mr. Moyle in the subject transaction.
5.

The Court received competent evidence from Mr. Day based on adequate

foundation that the optimum fair market value of the subject property at the time of the
transaction between the parties was $250,000.
6.

However, the damages recoverable by the plaintiffs based on benefit of the

bargain must be limited to the value of the property actually purchased.
7.

The defendant took the position that the existing telephone lines were

critical to the sale and held significant value.
8.

The Court finds that the telephone lines which were not included in the

sale had some value to the property, and were important to the continuity of the bed and
breakfast business which the plaintiffs intended to continue after the sale.
9.

The Court further finds however, that defendant the had little or nothing to

gain by keeping the existing phone lines.

10.

Based on all of the testimony, exhibits and other evidence offered in the

case, the Court finds that the fair market value of the property and assets purchased by
the plaintiffs, which is limited to that specifically set forth in the Real Estate Purchase
Contract was $235,000.
11.

The plaintiffs are entitled to damages based on the benefit of the bargain

from the contract which defendant breached in the amount of $50,000. In this case, the
benefit of the bargain is the difference between the fair market value of the property at
the time of sale as determined above, and the sales price agreed to by the defendant in the
real estate purchase contract. (FMV $235,000 - Sales Price $185,000 = $50,000.)
12.

The plaintiffs are further entitled to an award of their reasonable attorneys

fees and costs incurred in the case. Plaintiff submitted an Affidavit of costs and fees
through June 17, 1998, and requested an opportunity to supplement the Affidavit for
more recent work which was granted. Defendant was given an opportunity to examine
plaintiffs' counsel with respect to the fee affidavit and declined.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court hereby makes and enters the
following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court has previously ruled as a matter of law that the defendant

breached a Real Estate Purchase Contract with the plaintiffs.
2.

An appropriate measure of damages for the breach of a real estate contract

is that known as "benefit of the bargain," which is equal to the difference between the fanmarket value of the property at the time of sale and the agreed upon purchase price.
3.

On January 13, 1997, the date of the transaction, the fair market value of

the property and assets purchased by the plaintiffs, which property is specifically limited
to that set forth in the Real Estate Purchase Contract was $235,000.

4.

Since the contractual sales price was $185,000, the plaintiffs are entitled to

a Judgment based on benefit of the bargain in the amount of $50,000.
5.

Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of the reasonable costs and attorneys

fees incurred in the case in the amount of $5,285.98.

Dated thisJS^bay of

/jL/jl/Zf'

1998.

BY THE COURT

LONORABLE
Court Judge
Approved as to Form & Content

Leslie Slaugh
Attorney for the Defendant
Mailing Certificate
This is to certify that true and correct copies of Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and (Revised) Affidavit of Attornys Fees and were
mailed, postage prepaid to defendant's counsel JUffSLIE SLAUGH, P.O. Box 1248,
Provo, Utah 84603.

^^^>Sy^Zs

AFFIDAVIT OF STEVE RUSSELL
State of Utah )
) ss
Grand County )
Steve Russell, being first duly sworn, deposes and states that:
1.

I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Utah.

2.

In June, 1997,1 was retained by george & Sharon Copeland to represent her them

in a real estate matter concerning the purchase of a bed & breakfast property- at 590 North 500
West in Moab.
3.

On January 29, 1998, the Court entered a Judgment for Attorneys' Fees incurred

through August 13, 1997. Time and expenses related to previously awarded fees have not been
included here.
4.
8/18

8/19
8/20
8/28
toll/11
11/8
11/25
11/28
12/15
12/31
1/6

During the course of my representation I performed the services set forth below.
Settlement Meeting w/ Moyle/Gubler
Motion to alter measure of damages
from specific performance to
benefit of bargain; Affidavits
of Kingsley & Lewis
Finalize above pleadings & file
Phone Conference - Gubler; Kingsley
& Lewis re: settlement position
Request for Atty fees; Notice of
Appearance
various T.C. (several) w/ clients & Gubler
Settlement negotiation; discovery
deposition scheduling
Deposition Notice
Notice of depositions
Reschedule depos
2nd Discovery Requests
Notice to Submit Atty Fee matter for
decision; Notice of depo
Mtg. at Copelands' re. depositions
Draft Discover)' Responses

1.75

2.2
.85
.75
.5
2.0
.35
.5
.25
1.6
1.0
1.5
2.65

1/9
1/11
1/13
1/14
1/17
1/27
2/13
2/23
3/3
3/4
3/27
5/1
5/18
6/7
6/9
6/17
7/10
7/13/1998

5.

Prep for Moyle deposition
1.0
prep for Moyle deposition
2.25
Prepare for depos of George &
Sharon Copeland
1.0
Depositions of Nelson Moyle; Kelly
Stelter; George & Sharon
7.75
Draft request for execution of
Judgment
.5
Letter to Gubler w/ Discovery Requests
from Deposition
.7
Begin Draft of Reply to Motion for Summary
Judgment
3.15
Resp. to Defendant's Motion for Summary Jdmt;
Affidavits of Randy Day & George
Copeland
2.75
Prepare for and attend Hearing on Cross-Motions
for Summary Judgment
3.25
Draft Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
& Judgment
1.2
T.C. Christina Triplett re: damage claims
.75
702-789-2196; 856-1748
4570 China Rose Circle, Reno, NV 89502
Notice of Hearing
.25
Review & Work on Responses to Plaintiffs
Discovery; Conf. w/Clients; Draft Third
Discovery Requests & Requests for Admission 3.1
Mtg. w/ Copelands at Peach Tree; Review responses
to discovery and responsive documents;
revisions and additions to both
1.4
Final on Pltf s Responses to Discovery Requests
Review & Confirm w/ clients
2.65
Mtg. w/ Copelands; Draft Responses to Discovery
From Moyle re: 7/13 hearing
1.9
Mtg. w/ Suzanne Lewis & Randy Day re:
review of file and preparation for hearing 1.0
Mtg.. w/ Clients to prepare for hearing;
Hearing before Judge Anderson
3.4
My usual billing rate for such services is $100, which is reasonable and

consistent, if not below, the market rate.

6.

The Court and defense counsel have requested that I attempt to differentiate time

spent with regard to the Copelands' benefit of the bargain claim for damages, and the alternate
claims raised at the hearing on July 13, 1998. I made no attempt to do that during the course of
the action, and, aside from pure speculation, such a differentiation is impossible now. The
Copelands' primary claim has always been based on benefit of the bargain, the other damage
options being subsets which the Copelands put togetherfromtheir own records.
7.

Though I do not believe a reduction in the fee request is necessarily warranted, I

would not object to a reduction in the amount of $500, which is more than sufficient to cover the
concern raised by defense counsel.
8.

Total time spent on the case through June 17, 1998, was 53.9 hours ($5,390).

Costs include Deposition Expense $289.23; Copies $53.05; Long-Distance Phone $27.20; and
Postage $13.25. Total: $5,785.98. (Total with suggested reduction $5,285.98)
9.

The foregoing charges were reasonable and necessarily incurred in the

representation of George & Sharon Copeland.
Dated this Z^day of iTuW

, 1998.

S^
Steve Russell
On the Jjf day of S^Uiij
, 1998, personally appeared before me Steve
Russell, who stated that he had read the^oregoing Affidavit and that the information contained
therein is true to the best of his knowledge, information and belief. Steve Russell signed the
Affidavit in my presence.

GRAND COUNTY I AH &JUSIICF T N i t R
Steve Russell, ^ttorne\ (LSB#2831;
Attorney for the Plaintiff
394 West 400 North
Moab, Utah 84532
Telephone (801)259-7321

ce\/FM"

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT*<LED

'RICTCOi
mtv Utnv

" ^ *?

FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH

GEORGE & SHARON
COPELAND,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 9707-??
NELSON MOYLE,
Judge Anderson
Defendant.

The Court having made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the case,
now hereby awards
JUDGMENT, in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Nelson Movie as
follows:
1.

Plaintiffs' reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred m the action

In this

regard, counsel for the plambfts is directed to submit an Affidavit of costs and attorne\ s fees
following the heanng for determmabon of plainbffs' damages, and provide the same to counsel
for the defendant for review prior to determmabon by the Court
2.

Interest on any amount of damages found to have been caused by defendant's

breach of the contract at the legal rate of 10°o for contracts not specifying a rate of interest fiom
Januan H 1997 to March 3,1998 See, ^

15-1-1, U CM

3.

Interest on tho total Jud^nvnt as calculated above at the rate of 9.468% (7 468 +

2%, pursuant to Sec 15-1-4, UC A) from March \ i°98, until paid.

Dated this

day of

>

< _ >

1Q98.

BY T H E C O U R T

THE HONORABLE LYLE ANDERSON
District Court Judge

Approved as to Form & Content

Leslie Slaugh
Attorney for the Defendant

Mailing Certificate
This is to certify that true and correct copies of Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgments in Civil 9707-77 & 9707-96 w_ere mailed, postage prepaid to
defendant's counsel, LESLIE SLAUGH, P.O. Box 1248^PrcrcCytah,84603.

APPENDIX "I"
Judgment, Copeland v. Movie, entered August
5, 1998 (R. 234A-235A)

GRAND COUNTY LAW & JUSTICE CENTER
Steve Russell, Attorney (USB #2831)
Attorney for the Plaintiff
394 West 400 North
Moab, Utah 84532
Telephone: (801 )259-7321

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County, Utah
FILED

AUG - 5 1998

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH
SHARON & GEORGE COPELAND,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs,

v.

Civil No. 9707-77

NELSON MOYLE,
Judge Anderson
Defendant.

On March 17, 1998, the Court granted plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
based on breach of contract and entered a Judgment in plaintiffs5 favor and against the
defendant. See, copy attached.
On July 13, 1998, the Court held a hearing specifically to determine the nature
and extent of plaintiffs' damages.
The Court having made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
in the case, now hereby awards
JUDGMENT, in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Nelson Moyle
as follows:

1.

The amount of $50,000 as damages for breach of the real estate contract

based on benefit of the bargain.
-i

-Interest on that amount at tho legal rate of 10% for conliacls nut ^Irg

specifying f\ rsftp. nf intprprf, frnm Tnmimy I I \W i In Marr.h S HWK m the, miumnl f f

«$5,68<l.933.

Costs and attorneys fees of $5,285.98

4.

Interest at the legal rate of 7.468% on the total Judgment of $66,970.91 -

from March 4- 1998, until paid. {Tho mtoroot accrued ac of July 13j 1998 10 in the
mnuunluf $1,247.40:)

*-"S^

is
Dated this

1998.
BY THE COURT

[ONORABLE LYLE
Court Judge
Approved as to Form & Content

Leslie Slaugh
Attorney for the Defendant

<w^

—

APPENDIX "J"

Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-2b-2, 61-2b-3, 61-2b-9

CHAPTER 2b
REAL ESTATE APPRAISER
REGISTRATION AND
CERTIFICATION
Section
61-2b-l.
61-2b-2.
61-2b-3.
61-2b-4.

Section
61-2b-5.
61-2b-6.
61-2b-7.

Short title.
Definitions.
Registration or certification required.
Repealed.

83

Chapter administration.
Duties and powers of division.
Board established — Composition — Qualifications —
Terms of office — Expenses.

61-2b-l
Section
61-2b-8.
61-2b-9.
61-2b-10.
61-2b-ll.
61-2b-12.
61-2b-13.
61-2b-14.
61-2b-15.
61-2b-15.5.
61-2b-16.
61-2b-17.
61-2b-18.
61-2b-19.
61-2b-20.
61-2b-21.
61-2b-22.
61-2b-23.
61-2b-24.

SECURITIES DIVISION — REAL ESTATE DIVISION
Section
Duties of board.
Application for registration or
certification.
State-registered appraiser —
Authority and qualifications.
Curriculum to be determined by
board.
Repealed.
Senior appraiser — State-certified appraisers — Authority.
State-certified residential appraisers.
State-certified
general
appraiser — Application for certification.
Senior appraisers.
Certification requirements.
State appraisers — Restrictions
on use of term — Conduct
prohibited.
Application for certification.
Expiration of registration or
certification.
Renewal of registration or certification.
Denial of registration or certification.
Registration or certification requirements for nonresidents
— Temporary permits.
Reciprocal licensing.
Registration or certification
documents — Assigned num-

61-2b-25.
61-2b-26.
61-2b-27.
6 l-2b-28.
61-2b-29.
61-2b-30.
61-2b-31.
61-2b-32.
61-2b-33.
61-2b-34.
61-2b-35.
61-2b-36.
61-2b-37.
61-2b-38.
61-2b-39.
61-2b-40.
61-2b-41.

ber to be used on contracts —
Surrender of documents upon
suspension — Inspection of
documents.
Other law unaffected.
Principal place of business —
Display of documents.
Professional conduct — Uniform standards.
Enforcement — Investigation —
Orders — Hearings.
Unprofessional conduct.
Compliance with Administrative Procedures Act.
Disciplinary hearing process.
Registration or certification prerequisite to suit for compensation.
Criminal penalty — Registra,tion following conviction.
Recordkeeping requirements.
Repealed.
Contingent fees.
Division service fees — Federal
registry fees.
Division to publish roster of appraisers.
Certificate of Standing.
Continuing education requirements.
Consultation reports — Restrictions on use of terms.

61-2b-l. Short title.
This chapter is known as the "Real Estate Appraiser Registration and
Certification Act."
History: C. 1953, 61-2b-l, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 212, § 5.

61-2b-2.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) (a) "Appraisal" means an unbiased analysis, opinion, or conclusion
relating to the nature, quahty, value, or utility of specified interests
in, or aspects of, identified real estate or identified real property.
(b) Appraisals shall be classified by the nature of the assignment as
a valuation appraisal, an analysis assignment, or a review assignment in accordance with the following definitions:
(i) "Valuation appraisal" means an unbiased analysis, opinion,
or conclusion that estimates the value of an identified parcel of
real estate or identified real property at a particular point in time,
(ii) "Analysis assignment" means an unbiased analysis, opinion, or conclusion that relates to the nature, quahty, or utility of
identified real estate or identified real property.
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(iii) "Review assignment" means an unbiased analysis, opinion, or conclusion that forms an opinion as to the adequacy and
appropriateness of a valuation appraisal or an analysis assignment.
(2) "Appraisal Foundation" means the Appraisal Foundation that was
incorporated as an Illinois not-for-profit corporation on November 30,
1987.
(3) (a) "Appraisal report" means any communication, written or oral, of
an appraisal.
(b) An appraisal report shall be classified by the nature of the
assignment as a valuation report, analysis report, or review report in
accordance with the definitions provided in Subsection (l)(b).
(c) The testimony of a person relating to the person's analyses,
conclusions, or opinions concerning identified real estate or identified
real property is considered to be an oral appraisal report.
(4) "Board" means the Real Estate Appraiser Registration and Certification Board that is estabUshed under this chapter to provide technical
assistance and make recommendations to the division and perform certain
ancillary functions.
(5) "Certified appraisal report" means a written or oral appraisal report
that is certified as such by a state-certified general appraiser or statecertified residential appraiser. The certification of an appraisal report by a
state-certified real estate appraiser represents to the public that the
appraisal report meets the appraisal standards estabUshed under this
chapter.
(6) (a) (i) "Consultation service" means an engagement to provide a
real estate valuation service analysis, opinion, conclusion, or
other service that does not faU within the definition of appraisal,
(ii) "Consultation service" does not mean a valuation appraisal,
analysis assignment, or review assignment as provided in Subsection (l)(b).
(b) Regardless of the intention of the client or employer, if a person
prepares an unbiased analysis, opinion, or conclusion, the analysis,
opinion, or conclusion is considered to be an appraisal and not a
consultation service.
(7) "Contingent fee" means a fee or other form of compensation, payment of which is dependent on or conditioned by:
(a) the reporting of a predetermined analysis, opinion, or conclusion by the person performing the analysis, opinion, or conclusion; or
(b) achieving a result specified by the person requesting the analysis, opinion, or conclusion.
(8) "Division" means the Division of Real Estate of the Department of
Commerce.
(9) "FederaUy related transaction" means any real estate related transaction which is required by federal law or by federal regulation to be
supported by an appraisal prepared by a state certified appraiser.
(10) "Real estate" means an identified parcel or tract of land including
improvements if any.
(11) "Real estate appraisal activity" means the act or process of making
an appraisal of real estate or real property and preparing an appraisal
report.
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(12) "Real estate related transaction" means:
(a) the sale, lease, purchase, investment in, or exchange of real
property or an interest in real property, or the financing of such a
transaction;
(b) the refinancing of real property or an interest in real property;
or
(c) the use of real property or an interest in real property as
security for a loan or investment, including mortgage-backed securities.
(13) "Real property" means one or more defined interests, benefits, or
rights inherent in the ownership of real estate.
(14) "Senior appraiser" means a person grandfathered under this
chapter who holds a current, valid state certification issued to the person
based on the person's experience or designation as a member in good
standing in an appraisal organization that is a member of the Appraisal
Foundation.
(15) "State-certified general appraiser" means a person who holds a
current, valid certification as a state-certified general appraiser issued to
him under the provisions of this chapter. The state-certified general
appraiser classification consists of those persons who meet the requirements for certification relating to the appraisal of all types of real estate.
(16) "State-certified residential appraiser" means a person who holds a
current, valid certification as a state-certified residential real estate
appraiser issued to him under the provisions of this chapter. The statecertified residential appraiser classification consists of those persons who
meet the requirements for certification that relate to the appraisal of
residential real estate in federally related transactions.
(17) "State-registered appraiser" means a person who holds a current,
valid state registration as a real estate appraiser issued to him under the
provisions of this chapter. The state-registered appraiser classification
consists of those persons who meet the requirements for registration that
relate to the appraisal of all types of real estate in transactions that are
not federally related transactions.
(18) "Unbiased analysis, opinion, or conclusion" means an analysis,
opinion, or conclusion relating to the nature, quality, value, or utility or
identified real estate or identified real property that is prepared by a
person who is employed or retained to act, or would be perceived by third
parties or the public as acting, as a disinterested third party in rendering
the analysis, opinion, or conclusion.
History: C. 1953, 61-2b-2, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 212, § 6; 1991, ch. 245, § 2; 1996,
ch. 131, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, deleted former
Subsections (8) and (14) denning independent
and specialized appraisal services; added Subsections (6), (7), and (18) and redesignated the
other subsections accordingly; subdivided Subsections (1) and (3); inserted "unbiased"
throughout Subsection (1); in Subsection (14)
deleted "certified" before "Senior"; and made
stylistic and related changes.

86

Severability Clauses. — Laws 1991, ch.
245, which amended several sections throughout this chapter, provides in § 23: "If the provisions of tins act do not comply with the
provisions of the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 as determined by the Appraisal Subcommittee of the
Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council, the remainder of this act shall be given
effect without the invalid provisions." The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 amended the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1811 et seq.
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61-2b-3. Registration or certification required.
(1) It is unlawful for anyone to prepare, for valuable consideration, an
appraisal, an appraisal report, a certified appraisal report, or perform a
consultation service relating to real estate or real property in this state
without first being registered or certified in accordance with the provisions of
this chapter.
(2) This section does not apply to:
(a) a real estate broker or sales agent as defined by Section 61-2-2
licensed by this state who, in the ordinary course of his business, gives an
opinion:
(i) regarding the value of real estate;
(ii) to a potential seller or third party recommending a listing price
of real estate; or
(hi) to a potential buyer or third party recommending a purchase
price of real estate;
(b) an employee of a company who states an opinion of value or prepares
a report containing value conclusions relating to real estate or real
property solely for the company's use;
(c) any official or employee of a government agency while acting solely
within the scope of his duties, unless otherwise required by Utah law;
(d) an auditor or accountant who states an opinion of value or prepares
a report containing value conclusions relating to real estate or real
property while performing an audit;
(e) an individual, except an individual who is required to be registered
or certified under this chapter, who states an opinion about the value of
property in which he has an ownership interest;
(f) an individual who states an opinion of value if no consideration is
paid or agreed to be paid for the opinion and no other party is reasonably
expected to rely on the individual's appraisal expertise;
(g) an individual, such as a researcher or a secretary, who does not
render significant professional assistance, as defined by the board, in
arriving at a real estate appraisal analysis, opinion, or conclusion; or
(h) an attorney authorized to practice law in this state who, in the
course of his practice, utilizes an appraisal report governed by this chapter
or who states an opinion of the value of real estate.
(3) No opinion of value or report containing value conclusions exempt under
Subsection (2) may be referred to as an appraisal.
History: C. 1953, 61-2b-3, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 212, § 7; 1991, ch. 245, § 3; 1996,
ch. 131, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-

ment, effective April 29, 1996, inserted "for
valuable consideration" and "or perform a consultation service" in Subsection (1) and made
stylistic changes.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Applicability.
There was no error in the admission of the
testimony and appraisal of an unregistered and
uncertified appraiser made for the sole purpose
of supporting a utility's request for commission
action to reduce its tax assessment; m prepar-

mg a unit method of appraisal, the appraiser
did not identify specific parcels of real property
in his report as contemplated by this section,
Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Tax Comm'n ex rel.
MCI Telecom mum cations Corp., 895 P.2d 825
(Utah 1995).
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61-2b-9. Application for registration or certification.
Any individual who prepares or causes to be prepared an appraisal, an
appraisal report, or a certified appraisal report in this state, in order to
lawfully engage in such activity in this state, shall:
(1) make application in writing for registration or certification as
provided in this chapter in the form as the division may prescribe; and
(2) become registered or certified under this chapter.
History: C. 1953, 61-2b-9, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 212, § 13.

APPENDIX "K"

Utah Post-Judgment Interest Rates

UTAH POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST RATES

1

Date
pre 1981
1981 to May 3, 1993

Rate
8.0
12.0

May 3, 1993 to Dec. 31, 1993

5.72

1994

5.61

1995

9.22

1996

7.35

1997

7.45

1998

7.468

1 1999

I

6.513 1

APPENDIX "L"
Memorandum, May 6, 1993, Administrative
Office of the Courts

Itmtimstratibe Office of tfje Courts
Chief Justice Gordon R Hall
Chairman. Utah Judicial Council

Ronald W Gibson
State Court Administrator

MEMORANDUM
TO:

JUDGES OF COURTS OF RECORD
JUDGES OF COURTS NOT OF RECORD
ACTIVE SENIOR JUDGES
COURT COMMISSIONERS
COURT EXECUTIVES
CLERKS OF COURT
AOC ADMINISTRATORS
AOC FINANCE DIVISION

FROM:

Colin Winchester
General Counsel

DATE:

May 6, 1993

RE:

S.B. 279 and Post judgment interest rates

or""

Senate Bill 279, effective May 3, 1993, has amended Utah Code
Ann. S 15-1-4 to read:
(1) Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract shall
conform to the contract and shall bear the interest rate
agreed upon by the parties, which shall be specified in
the judgment.
(2) Other judgments shall bear interest at the federal
post judgment interest rate as of January 1 of each year,
plus 2%.
(3) "Federal postjudgment interest rate" means the
interest rate established for the federal court system
under 28 U.S.C.Sec 1961, as amended.
Several questions have arisen regarding the proper application
of this amendment. First, should the law be applied retroactively?
Second, is the interest rate on judgments to be readjusted
annually? Third, what is the currently applicable interest rate?
After researching both state and federal law and discussing
the issue with the Office of Legislative Research & General
Counsel, I have concluded that the law should not be applied
retroactively. That conclusion is consistent with decisions of the
Utah Supreme Court which have held that, absent express legislative
intent, a statute which affects substantive rights should not be
given retroactive effect. Brunver v. Salt' Lake County. 551 P.2d
521 (Utah 1976).
*
The interest rate for any particular judgment is to be
determined as of the date of the judgment, and that rate remains
applicable for the duration of the judgment. While the statute is
not entirely clear on this point, counsel at the Office of
Legislative Research & General Counsel assures me that this was the
intent. This interpretation is further supported by the fact that
S.B. 279 has been specifically modeled on the federal postjudgment
interest rate statute, which has been interpreted as allowing for
only one interest rate for the life of a given judgment. See
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Boniorno. 110 S.Ct. 1570, 1577
(1990).
The interest rate which applies to judgments (other than
judgments based on contracts specifying an interest rate agreed
upon by the parties) rendered between May 3, 1993 and December 31,
1993 is 5.72%.
You will be notified by the AOC each January as to the new
interest rate.

